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Katrina M. Wyman* & Nicholas R. Williams† 
Abstract 
The boundaries between land parcels usually are assumed to be static 
and unchanging. However, not all land borders are stable. An important 
land boundary that routinely ambulates is the border between what is 
publicly and privately owned along U.S. coastal shores. This coastal 
boundary recently has been the subject of renewed attention from the 
courts, scholars, and even the popular press in the wake of Hurricane 
Sandy. This Article offers an economic analysis of why the boundary 
generally ambulates, rather than remaining perpetually fixed as land 
borders usually are assumed to do. It also considers whether the legal 
border generally should continue to migrate in an era of sea level rise 
due to climate change.  
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INTRODUCTION 
We usually conceive of land borders as static and unchanging, and 
sometimes literally fixed in stone.1 Indeed, stability might seem to be a 
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 1. Think of Robert Frost’s famous poem Mending Wall, in which the two neighbors 
preserve the boundary between them by meeting each year to fix the fence of stones that 
separates them. ROBERT FROST, Mending Wall, in THE POETRY OF ROBERT FROST 33–34 
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prerequisite for borders given that they are intended “to provide 
certainty and permanence.”2 The idea that land borders are fixed also is 
embedded in contemporary theoretical work on property. A prominent 
example is Professor Henry Smith’s characterization of land boundaries 
as “rough” “on/off” “signals” that tell us to keep off others’ property. 3 
If land boundaries routinely fluctuated, it would be hard for them to act 
as clear signals.4  
Not all land borders, however, are stable and well suited to serve as 
on/off signals. One dramatically unstable land border is the boundary 
between what is privately and publicly owned along U.S. ocean shores.5 
This boundary is usually defined as the “ordinary high water mark,”6 
which in many coastal states is further specified as the “mean high-
water line.”7 Areas landward of the mean high water line are often 
private property, while state governments often own the lands seaward 
of the mean high water line subject to the public trust doctrine.8 Many 
Americans have the right to walk on coastal shores because state 
                                                                                                                     
(Edward Connery Lathem ed., 1969). 
 2.  Donna R. Christie, Of Beaches, Boundaries and SOBs, 25 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 
19, 26 n.41 (2009).  
 3. Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1753 (2004) 
[hereinafter Smith, Property and Property Rules]; see also Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law 
of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691, 1713–14 (2012) [hereinafter Smith, Property as the Law of 
Things]; Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1849, 1890 (2007) (“Exclusion by its nature protects a wide variety of uses, and the signal 
for violation is a simple on/off signal easily perceived by all—a boundary crossing in the case of 
land.”); Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U. TORONTO L.J. 275, 280 
n.17 (2008) (“[T]he on/off function of boundaries is fundamental to Smith’s understanding of 
the standard case of property.”). 
 4. Though Smith’s work does not explicitly discuss the idea that land borders are stable, 
the idea is implicit in his work. See, e.g., Smith, Property as the Law of Things, supra note 3, at 
1713–14; Smith, Property and Property Rules, supra note 3, at 1765.  
Recent work by economists further bolsters the case for stable land borders, suggesting that 
they promote investment and facilitate the exchange of land rights. See Gary D. Libecap & Dean 
Lueck, Land Demarcation Systems, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY 
LAW 257, 257 (Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E. Smith eds., 2011).  
 5. See, e.g., JOSH EAGLE, COASTAL LAW 89 (2011); Lora A. Lucero, A Line in the Sand, 
PLAN. & ENVTL. L., Jan. 2010, at 12. 
 6. BRUCE S. FLUSHMAN, WATER BOUNDARIES: DEMYSTIFYING LAND BOUNDARIES 
ADJACENT TO TIDAL OR NAVIGABLE WATERS 73 (2002). 
 7. Id. at 119–21. 
 8. See, e.g., Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410–11 (1842); 
Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 230 (1845). The public trust often 
encompasses the wet beach underwater during high tide (also called the foreshore), and 
submerged lands underlying tidal and navigable waters. There are useful diagrams of the areas 
along the beach in EAGLE, supra note 5, at 90 (referring to “Wet sand or Foreshore”), and James 
G. Titus, Rising Seas, Coastal Erosion, and the Takings Clause: How to Save Wetlands and 
Beaches Without Hurting Property Owners, 57 MD. L. REV. 1279, 1291 fig.2 (1998). For a 
discussion of the scope of the public trust, see, for example, id. at 1291, 1292–94, 1365–68. 
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governments own the wet beach under the public trust.9  
There has been a recent resurgence of interest in the boundary 
between private and public trust property along the coasts. The coastal 
boundary was a central issue in a widely discussed 2010 decision from 
the U.S. Supreme Court,10 and several scholars recently turned their 
attention to doctrines related to the boundary.11 In the wake of 
Hurricane Sandy, which ravaged coastal shorelines in New Jersey, New 
York, and Connecticut in October 2012, the legal rules determining the 
coastal boundary have been discussed beyond the courts and academia 
and in the popular press.12  
This Article analyzes why the legal boundary between private and 
public trust property along the ocean coastline generally ambulates, 
rather than remaining fixed at a defined point as land borders usually 
are assumed to do. We might be tempted to attribute the generally 
ambulatory character of the boundary to natural forces.13 The 
geographic location of the mean high water line shifts because of 
physical changes altering the shore, such as the addition or the loss of 
sand on the beach.14 But nature does not explain, by itself, why the legal 
boundary should also move, and legal decision makers can opt not to 
allow the boundary to follow the changes along the beach.15 The 
common law offers a choice between freezing the boundary at the old 
mean high water line by deploying the doctrine of avulsion, and shifting 
the boundary in accordance with the changes wrought by nature by 
using the doctrines of accretion and erosion (referred to collectively as 
                                                                                                                     
 9. See Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently 
Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 713–14 (1986); Robert Thompson, Beach Access, 
Trespass, and the Social Enactment of Property, 17 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 351, 352 
(2012). 
 10. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592 
(2010). 
 11. See generally J. Peter Byrne, The Cathedral Engulfed: Sea-Level Rise, Property 
Rights, and Time, 73 LA. L. REV. 69 (2012); Richard A. Epstein, Littoral Rights Under the 
Takings Doctrine: The Clash Between the Ius Naturale and Stop the Beach Renourishment, 6 
DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 37 (2011); Thomas W. Merrill, Accession and Original 
Ownership, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 459, 465 (2009); Joseph L. Sax, The Accretion/Avulsion 
Puzzle: Its Past Revealed, Its Future Proposed, 23 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 305 (2010).  
 12. See, e.g., Andrew W. Karhl, The People’s Beach, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2012, at A31, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/05/opinion/beaches-belong-to-the-public.html. 
 13. See City of Long Branch v. Jui Yung Liu, 4 A.3d 542, 549–51 (N.J. 2010); Severance 
v. Patterson, 370 S.W.3d 705, 718 (Tex. 2012); Christie, supra note 2, at 26.  
 14. EAGLE, supra note 5, at 308. 
 15. In Florida, for example, a state statute provides that before state-funded beach 
renourishment projects, the state fixes the legal boundary in relation to the “pre-existing mean 
high-water line.” Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2599. This fixed line “replaces 
the fluctuating mean high-water line as the boundary between privately owned littoral property 
and state property.” Id. Note, though, that there may be legal obstacles to fixing the boundary.  
See infra note 61 and accompanying text. 
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“accretion,” unless otherwise noted).16 It is because of the 
“contemporary strong presumption in favor of accretion” in the law that 
the legal boundary between private and public trust property generally 
shifts to follow the current mean high water line.17 
This Article offers an economic rationale for the generally 
ambulatory legal boundary between private and public trust property 
along coastal shores. It argues that the tendency to shift the legal 
boundary between private and public trust property to accord with 
physical changes on the beach is likely efficient. The current 
presumption in favor of a migratory boundary is a reasonably clear rule 
that puts private and public landowners on notice that the boundaries of 
their coastal holdings are subject to change along with physical 
alterations of the shore and encourages landowners to plan accordingly. 
Routinely fixing boundaries at a historic point also would be a 
reasonably clear rule, but a presumption in favor of fixed boundaries 
would lack two advantages of a migratory boundary. First, and most 
importantly, a migratory boundary maximizes the value of both private 
and public trust property along the shore by preserving the water 
adjacency of both types of property.18 Second, an ambulatory boundary 
has administrative advantages for the courts and private and public 
landowners because it avoids the need to recreate a historic boundary.19 
                                                                                                                     
 16. In using the term “accretion” broadly to refer to accretion as well as erosion, we 
follow Sax, supra note 11, at 306 n.2; see also Byrne, supra note 11, at 80 & n.49. Professor 
Sax’s use of “accretion” to refer to accretion as well as erosion may be a bit unconventional. For 
narrower uses of accretion to refer to the gradual addition of land to the shore, but not erosion, 
see, for example, EAGLE, supra note 5, at 308; FLUSHMAN, supra note 6, at 92; Merrill, supra 
note 11, at 465.  
 17. Sax, supra note 11, at 346; see also infra note 66 (citing other sources referring to the 
presumption in favor of accretion). 
 18. As mentioned below, commentators seem to agree that the principal rationale given by 
the courts for an ambulatory boundary is the preservation of the water adjacency of private 
landowners. The benefit of preserving public access to the wet beach and tidal and navigable 
waters seems less well recognized. See infra notes 108–09 and accompanying text. 
 19. A brief word is in order about other scholarship that refers to the efficiency of 
accretion. In a recent article critiquing the Supreme Court’s decision in Stop the Beach 
Renourishment, Professor Richard Epstein suggests that there is an economic logic to the 
Roman law doctrine of alluvion due to its “low administrative costs” and preservation of 
“[a]ccess to the ocean.” Epstein, supra note 11, at 52. Accretion narrowly construed as the 
addition of land is the modern descendant of the doctrine of alluvion. Alluvion is better 
understood today to refer to “the material deposited” through the physical addition of land to the 
shore. Sax, supra note 11, at 306 n.2. We are grateful to Epstein for drawing our attention to his 
recent article. Our argument that a migratory boundary is generally efficient is based largely on 
English and American sources rather than the Roman law sources that Epstein discusses.  
In addition, Professor Thomas Merrill recently offered an efficiency rationale for accretion 
(narrowly construed), which he views as an example of the principle of accession. Merrill, supra 
note 11, at 465–66. See infra note 79 for our critical analysis of Merrill’s treatment of accretion 
as an instance of accession.  
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After underscoring the “efficiency properties”20 of the current 
preference for shifting the boundary, this Article examines whether the 
legal boundary generally should continue to migrate with changes due 
to natural forces in an era of climate change. In the aftermath of 
Hurricane Sandy, many observers have underscored the need to prepare 
coastal regions to adapt to climate change.21 The question of whether 
the boundary should continue to migrate arises because sea level rise 
due to climate change is expected to gradually shift the mean high water 
line landward. If the common law doctrine of erosion is allowed to play 
out as usual, public trust property will expand at the expense of private 
property, as the mean high water line moves landward.22 Under existing 
law, the private landowners who lose property rights due to sea level 
rise are not entitled to compensation.23 The “unidirectional”24 nature of 
the expected changes has prompted at least one commentator to raise a 
question about the justice of applying the existing rule going forward 
and to mention the option of compensating private property owners who 
lose land to the public trust due to sea level rise.25 This Article argues 
against revising the preference for a migratory boundary because such a 
preference will likely prove efficient in the future as well. 
The coastal boundary is important in practice due to the public’s 
interests in the coast and the value of private coastal property.26 The 
coastal boundary is of theoretical interest because of the centrality of 
borders in exclusion-based understandings of property, such as 
                                                                                                                     
 20. The phrase “efficiency properties” is borrowed from Merrill, who uses it in analyzing 
the principle of accession. Merrill, supra note 11, at 501.  
 21. Matthew L. Wald & Danny Hakim, Storm Panel Recommends Major Changes in New 
York, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2013, at A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/07/nyreg 
ion/new-york-state-storm-panel-recommends-major-changes.html. 
 22. See infra note 135.  
 23. See infra note 76 and accompanying text.  
 24. Margaret E. Peloso & Margaret R. Caldwell, Dynamic Property Rights: The Public 
Trust Doctrine and Takings in a Changing Climate, 30 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 51, 88 (2011) (“Sea 
level rise is a unidirectional change that will result in the continuous encroachment of the sea on 
to littoral property.”); Joseph L. Sax, Some Unorthodox Thoughts About Rising Sea Levels, 
Beach Erosion, and Property Rights, 11 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 641, 645 (2010) (noting that the 
“migratory boundary” is “unidirectional . . . with modern sea level rise”). 
 25. J. Peter Byrne, Rising Seas and Common Law Baselines: A Comment on Regulatory 
Takings Discourse Concerning Climate Change, 11 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 625, 633, 639 (2010); 
Byrne, supra note 11, at 80, 96. Other sources more obliquely raise the prospect of changing the 
rules of the game due to sea level rise. CHRISTINE A. KLEIN ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCES LAW: 
A PLACE-BASED BOOK OF PROBLEMS AND CASES 674 (2d. ed. 2009) (asking whether “the 
public/private boundary [should] migrate in accordance with changes in sea level”); Sax, supra 
note 11, at 355–56; Michael A. Hiatt, Note, Come Hell or High Water: Reexamining the 
Takings Clause in A Climate Changed Future, 18 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 371, 383 (2008) 
(“Large-scale sea level rise due to climate change should be considered beyond the scope of the 
common law doctrine of erosion and accretion.”). 
 26. See, e.g., Christie, supra note 2, at 21–24, 29. 
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Professor Smith’s, that currently dominate scholarly thinking about 
property.27 Nevertheless, scholars have paid relatively little attention to 
the legal rules that govern boundary determination along the ocean 
shores—or inland.28  
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides background on the 
legal rules that govern the boundary between private and public trust 
property on U.S. shores. Part II demonstrates that a concern with 
efficiency undergirds the existing preference for a migratory boundary. 
It begins by arguing that five rationales offered in case law and by 
commentators for an ambulatory boundary can be understood as 
reflecting a concern with efficiency. We then offer our own explanation 
for why an ambulatory boundary likely is efficient, drawing on themes 
that emerge from the existing rationales. Part III emphasizes the 
desirability of preserving the preference for an ambulatory boundary in 
an era of sea level rise. We briefly conclude. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
As the immense damage inflicted in the Northeast by Hurricane 
Sandy recently underscored, many Americans live on land near the 
oceans.29 Immediately adjoining the private—and sometimes public30—
lands on which Americans live along the shore are vast areas often 
owned by the states that are covered by the public trust doctrine. This 
Article is about the boundary between the lands that lie upward of the 
dividing line, which we call private property (although some may be 
                                                                                                                     
 27. Hanoch Dagan, Pluralism and Perfectionism in Private Law, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 
1409, 1413 (2012) (indicating that “several leading property scholars are again considering the 
right to exclude as the most defining feature of property”); Henry E. Smith, Commentary to 
Richard A. Epstein, Playing by Different Rules? Property Rights in Land and Water, in 
PROPERTY IN LAND AND OTHER RESOURCES 356, 357 n.3 (Daniel H. Cole & Elinor Ostrom eds., 
2013) (referring to “exclusion theorists”).  
 28. Libecap & Lueck, supra note 4, at 258 (“While the demarcation of land is 
fundamental to a system of property law it is largely unexplored by property law scholars and 
instead simply, or implicitly, taken for granted.”). The way that people communicate their 
claims to property is a related issue that has received attention from property scholars. See, e.g., 
Robert C. Ellickson, The Inevitable Trend Toward Universal Recognizable Signals of Property 
Claims: An Essay for Carol Rose, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1015, 1022–32 (2011) 
(discussing Professor Carol Rose’s great interest in the communication of property claims and 
his own thoughts on the matter).  
 29. The press coverage of rebuilding in communities affected by Hurricane Sandy points 
to the human presence along the coasts. David M. Halbfinger et al., On Ravaged Coastline, It’s 
Rebuild Deliberately vs. Rebuild Now, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2012, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/22/nyregion/on-ravaged-coastline-its-rebuild-deliberately-vs-
rebuild-now.html. 
 30. Jonathan Mahler, How the Coastline Became a Place to Put the Poor, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 3, 2012, at A29, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/04/nyregion/how-new-
york-citys-coastline-became-home-to-the-poor.html. 
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publicly owned), and the lands seaward of the dividing line, which we 
refer to as public trust property. Public trust property is often state 
owned, but can be privately owned “subject to the public trust.”31  
Rooted in Roman and English law, the public trust doctrine dictates 
that coastal states hold the lands underlying tidal and navigable waters 
in trust for the public.32 There is a strong economic rationale for keeping 
these lands under state ownership and open to the public, well explored 
by scholars such as Professor Carol Rose and Professor Richard 
Epstein.33 As a general matter, these lands are distinct from uplands and 
suitable for different purposes. As the Florida Supreme Court once 
explained:  
The beaches of Florida are of such a character as to use 
and potential development as to require separate 
consideration from other lands with respect to the elements 
and consequences of title. The sandy portion of the beaches 
are of no use for farming, grazing, timber production, or 
residency—the traditional uses of land—but has served as a 
thoroughfare and haven for fishermen and bathers, as well 
as a place of recreation for the public.34 
Public ownership likely is the highest and best use of public trust 
lands because it facilitates public use of these lands for the purposes for 
which they are suited, namely the triad of navigation, commerce, and 
fisheries traditionally protected by the public trust doctrine, and other 
purposes more recently protected by the public trust, such as 
recreation.35 Rose argues that public use of the trust lands has “scale 
                                                                                                                     
 31. 11 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 79A.01[6] (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 1999).  
 32. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 718 (Cal. 1983) (noting the 
public trust doctrine’s origins).  
 33. See generally Richard A. Epstein, The Public Trust Doctrine, 7 CATO J. 411 (1987); 
Rose, supra note 9; J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Ecosystem Services and the Public Trust 
Doctrine: Working Change from Within, 15 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J. 223, 224–29 (2006). 
See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Public Trust Doctrine: A Conservative Reconstruction & 
Defense, 15 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J. 47, 62–64 (2006); see Titus, supra note 8, at 1364; see 
also Joseph D. Kearny & Thomas W. Merrill, The Origins of the American Public Trust 
Doctrine: What Really Happened in Illinois Central, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 799, 929 (2004) (“A 
resource such as submerged land under navigable waters requires a kind of blend of open access 
and exclusion rights.” (citing Epstein, supra, at 417)). 
 34. City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 294 So. 2d 73, 77 (Fla. 1974); see also 
FLUSHMAN, supra note 6, at 75–76; Christie, supra note 2, at 21 (quoting Daytona Beach, 294 
So. 2d at 77). Notably, beaches are generally located only partly on public trust lands. The 
public trust encompasses the wet beach, but does not usually provide public access to the dry 
beach. For exceptions, see Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American 
Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745, 802–03 (2009) and Titus, supra note 8, at 1293, 1366–
68.  
 35. On the evolution of the public trust doctrine, see, for example, Cinque Bambini P’ship 
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returns”: commerce generates ever-increasing wealth, for example, 
while unrestricted public recreation (as well as commerce) may be 
“socializing practice[s]” whose benefits are enhanced by the 
participation of larger numbers of people.36 Epstein focuses on the risk 
that private control of property covered by the public trust would result 
in holdout behavior—a particularly acute risk along navigable 
waterways.37 The public trust doctrine acts as a check on government 
alienation of trust lands and waters, and preserves public access to 
them.38 In Judge Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed’s terms,39 
the public has an entitlement to the lands seaward of the mean high 
water line that is protected by the public trust doctrine’s restrictions on 
alienability.40 
The boundary between private and public trust property is usually 
defined as the ordinary high water mark.41 Since the early twentieth 
                                                                                                                     
v. State, 491 So. 2d 508, 512 (Miss. 1986); Alexandra B. Klass, Modern Public Trust 
Principles: Recognizing Rights and Integrating Standards, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699, 699, 
707–14 (2006); and Rose, supra note 9, at 713–14, 727–30.  
There also may be valuable resources in submerged lands, such as oil. Phillips Petroleum 
Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 472 (1988); Cinque Bambini, 491 So. 2d at 511, aff’d, Phillips 
Petroleum Co., 484 U.S. 469; Robert E. Beck, The Wandering Missouri: A Study in Accretion 
Law, 43 N.D. L. REV. 429, 437 (1967). 
 36. Rose, supra note 9, at 777; see generally id. at 766–70, 775–81. In noneconomic 
terms, we might say that holding certain types of property and use of that property open for the 
public is fundamentally important to the well-being of society. See Robin Kundis Craig, 
Adapting to Climate Change: The Potential Role of State Common-Law Public Trust Doctrines, 
34 VT. L. REV. 781, 798 (2010). 
 37. Epstein, supra note 33, at 415; see also PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215, 
1230 (2012); Rose, supra note 9, at 750, 753–60. 
Rose observes that “even if the holdout danger was necessary for a presumption of 
‘publicness,’ that danger cannot have been sufficient. Surely, there should also be some reason 
to suppose that a property will be more valuable if open to public access than it would be under 
exclusive control.” Rose, supra note 9, at 761. She maintains “that the ‘scale returns’ of 
socialization, taken together with the possibility of private holdout, will underlie any arguments 
for the inherent publicness of property.” Id. at 781. 
 38. See generally Klass, supra note 35, at 699 (“To some, the doctrine is a vehicle for 
public access to water, beaches, or fishing in a world otherwise dominated by private ownership. 
To others it is a check on government attempts to give away or sell such resources for short-
term economic gain.”); Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: 
Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 478–85, 556–65 (1970) (analyzing ideas 
underpinning the public trust and the public trust doctrine).  
 39. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092–93, 1111–15 (1972) 
(distinguishing inalienability rules from both property rules and liability rules, and discussing 
inalienability rules in detail). 
 40. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 33, at 802 (“Illinois Central . . . . was the first 
prominent decision squarely to hold that lands submerged under navigable waters are subject to 
a rule of inalienability.” (citing Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 39)). 
 41. EAGLE, supra note 5, at 89 (“Most states set the legal coastline at the high-water 
mark.”); FLUSHMAN, supra note 6, at 73; David J. Bederman, The Curious Resurrection of 
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century, the ordinary high water mark has been more precisely defined 
in many states as the “mean high-water line,”42 consistent with a 1935 
Supreme Court decision defining the boundary as the “mean high-tide 
line” when federal patents are involved.43 In some states the boundary 
                                                                                                                     
Custom: Beach Access and Judicial Takings, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1375, 1376 n.6 (1996); David 
C. Slade et al., Lands, Waters and Living Resources Subject to the Public Trust Doctrine, in 
PUTTING THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO WORK 13, 44 n.58 (1990) (listing cases defining the 
landward boundary of the public trust in each coastal state); Titus, supra note 8, at 1365–66. 
This Article is concerned with the boundary between private and public trust property along 
the ocean coasts. The boundary between private and public trust property also may be defined as 
the “ordinary high water mark” for other bodies of water. Bruce S. Flushman states that “[t]he 
property boundary of lands adjacent to navigable lakes, the beds of which are owned by the 
states, is, in most cases, the ordinary high water mark.” FLUSHMAN, supra note 6, at 295 
(footnote omitted). In Glass v. Goeckel, the majority of the Michigan Supreme Court held that 
the boundary for the application of the public trust doctrine on the Great Lakes is the “ordinary 
high water mark” and that this is defined (following Wisconsin precedent) as “‘the point on the 
bank or shore up to which the presence and action of water is so continuous as to leave a distinct 
mark either by erosion, destruction of terrestrial vegetation, or other easily recognized 
characteristic.’” 703 N.W.2d 58, 72 (Mich. 2005) (quoting Diana Shooting Club v. Husting, 145 
N.W. 816, 820 (Wis. 1914)). The dissenting opinions in the case, which would have defined the 
boundary as the “water’s edge,” emphasized that the ordinary high water mark is a hard 
boundary to apply to nontidal waters like the Great Lakes, a point the majority partly 
acknowledged. Id. at 79 (Young, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Id. at 83, 85, 93, 
96–102 (Markman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Id. at 71. In State ex rel. 
Merrill v. Ohio Department of Natural Resources, the Supreme Court of Ohio refused to define 
the boundary for the public trust along Lake Erie as “the ordinary high-water mark,” and 
insisted that the boundary is the “‘natural shoreline,’ which is the line at which the water usually 
stands when free from disturbing causes.” 955 N.E.2d 935, 939 (Ohio 2011); see also id. at 947 
(refusing to define the boundary as the ordinary high-water mark based on precedent). We thank 
Professor Joseph Sax for emphasizing the relevance of Glass and Merrill. 
 42. FLUSHMAN, supra note 6, at 121; see also EAGLE, supra note 5, at 182; Christie, supra 
note 2, at 32; Slade et al., supra note 41, at 44 n.58; Peloso & Caldwell, supra note 24, at 57. On 
the timing of the move toward greater precision in defining the boundary between private and 
public trust property, see FLUSHMAN, supra note 6, at 104–10, 119–21. 
 43. Borax Consol., Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 14–15 (1935). State law defines the 
boundary between public trust and private property, except “with respect to uplands claimed 
under federal patent,” when federal law applies. EAGLE, supra note 5, at 98. 
The move to more precisely define the ordinary high water mark is likely related to the 
growth in the value of coastal property and the “heightened awareness of the value of the 
public’s shore lands” which probably increased the benefits of greater precision in coastal 
boundary determinations. FLUSHMAN, supra note 6, at 105–06; Frank E. Maloney & Richard C. 
Ausness, The Use and Legal Significance of the Mean High Water Line in Coastal Boundary 
Mapping, 53 N.C. L. REV. 185, 245–46 (1974); see also In re Ashford, 440 P.2d 76, 91 (Haw. 
1968) (Marumoto, J., dissenting) (excerpting testimony indicating that it only “bec[a]me 
important” to determine “the precise location” of the seaward boundary after “the value of 
oceanside properties went up”). 
The costs of defining a more precise boundary also may have declined over time. Originally 
to assist with navigation, the federal government began to collect tidal observations in the 1850s 
and developed “maps” of coastlines. FLUSHMAN, supra note 6, at 118; see also In re Ashford, 
440 P.2d at 82 (Marumoto, J., dissenting). The availability of this information facilitated more 
9
Wyman and Williams:  Migrating Boundaries
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
1966 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65 
 
between private and public trust property is more favorable to private 
landowners, extending to the low water mark.44 There are also a few 
states where the boundary between private and public trust property is 
not defined by reference to data about the tides, but rather is defined as 
the “vegetation line.”45 From the public’s perspective, the vegetation 
line is an expansive boundary because it lies upland of the mean high 
water line (and necessarily the low water mark), and state ownership up 
to the vegetation line means the state owns the dry as well as the wet 
beach.46 The vegetation line is more easily discerned when walking on 
the beach than the mean high water line,47 but the vegetation line is not 
as precise.48  
The mean high water line is a precise boundary determined by a 
survey and tidal data, but the boundary shifts regularly due to changes 
in the landform along the shore.49 There are “vertical” and “horizontal” 
                                                                                                                     
accurate boundary determination using tidal data. FLUSHMAN, supra note 6, at 115–16, 118–19; 
Charles E. Corker, Where Does the Beach Begin, and to What Extent Is This a Federal 
Question?, 42 WASH. L. REV. 33, 63, 65 (1966). 
 44. Eagle indicates that “[s]even states—Delaware, Maine, Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Virginia and Wisconsin—extend the area capable of ordinary private 
ownership to the low-water mark.” EAGLE, supra note 5, at 89. James G. Titus indicates that the 
boundary is the low water mark in five states (Maine, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Delaware, 
and Virginia). Titus, supra note 8, at 1293 n.41. However, Titus emphasizes that: 
Ownership . . . is only part of the picture. In the five states where the 
tidelands are privately owned, the public still has an easement along the 
tidelands for at least some purposes—for example, hunting, fishing, and 
navigation. In several states, the public has access along the dry beach for 
recreational use as well. 
Titus, supra note 8, at 1293.  
 45. FLUSHMAN, supra note 6, at 107; Titus, supra note 8, at 1366 n.360. States that use the 
vegetation line may consider it a specification of the “high-water mark” or “high-water line,” 
and the vegetation line may serve as a proxy for the upper reach of the tides. Dolphin Lane 
Assocs. Ltd. v. Town of Southampton, 333 N.E.2d 358, 359–60 (N.Y. 1975). 
In defining the boundary for the public trust along the Great Lakes as the ordinary high 
water mark, the Supreme Court of Michigan suggested that a mark left by the “‘destruction of 
terrestrial vegetation’” might signal the ordinary high water mark. Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 62 
(quoting State v. Trudeau, 408 N.W.2d 337, 342 (Wis. 1987)). Concurring in part and dissenting 
in part, Justice Young asked, “[I]n what sense would the line of vegetation be an ordinary high 
water mark in the sense suggested by the majority’s definition?” Id. at 81 (Young, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part). 
 46. Titus, supra note 8, at 1290–92, 1366 n.360.  
 47. Christie, supra note 2, at 31. 
 48. See Ashford, 440 P.2d at 80 (Marumoto, J., dissenting). 
 49. See In re 1 AARON L. SHALOWITZ, SHORE AND SEA BOUNDARIES 89–90 (1962); Joseph 
J. Kalo, North Carolina Oceanfront Property and Public Waters and Beaches: The Rights of 
Littoral Owners in the Twenty-First Century, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1427, 1444 (2005) (noting that 
“natural forces [may] change the contours of the beach itself” and therefore shift the “mean high 
tide line”). 
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components of the boundary.50 The vertical component is based “on the 
height reached by the tide during its vertical rise and fall” over a 
roughly nineteen-year period.51  The “mean high water” level is “[t]he 
average height of all the high-waters at a location for a period of 19 
years.”52 Tidal observations from the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration’s National Ocean Service or predecessor 
agencies may be used to calculate the vertical component, perhaps 
supplemented by tidal observations from other sources.53 While the 
vertical component of the boundary  
is basically stable, being based on observations over 
nineteen years[, t]he horizontal element of the boundary 
determination on a sandy beach is anything but stable. The 
intersection of the horizontal plane of mean high water 
changes with erosion and accretion, seasonal variations in 
the beach, wind, waves, storms and man-made changes to 
the beach—anything that changes the profile of the 
beach. . . . It follows that even the most accurate 
determination of the [mean high water line] for a dynamic 
sandy beach is no more than a snapshot of the boundary at 
that particular time and place.54 
Due to the constantly changing nature of the mean high water line 
boundary, the boundary does not provide a clear on/off signal. Thus 
there are difficulties enforcing laws against trespassing in coastal states 
that use the mean high water line as the boundary.55 For example, in 
State v. Ibbison,56 six defendants cleaning up a beach in Rhode Island 
were charged with criminal trespass on the basis that they had ventured 
onto private oceanfront property.57 After holding that the boundary 
                                                                                                                     
 50. 1 SHALOWITZ, supra note 49, at 89; see also FLUSHMAN, supra note 6, at 78 (“[T]here 
are two physical components of any water boundary determination: the landform’s elevation, 
slope, and composition and the relative elevation of the water level that impresses itself against 
the landform.”).  
 51. 1 SHALOWITZ, supra note 49, at 89; see also Luttes v. State, 324 S.W.2d 167, 174, 181 
(Tex. 1958) (describing processes for determining the mean high water); GEORGE M. COLE, 
WATER BOUNDARIES 15–17 (1997); FLUSHMAN, supra note 6, at 117–18.  
 52.  FLUSHMAN, supra note 6, at 117, 118 n.83. 
 53. Christie, supra note 2, at 33–34; see also COLE, supra note 51, at 45. 
 54. Christie, supra note 2, at 34 (footnote omitted); see also COLE, supra note 51, at 42, 
45; FLUSHMAN, supra note 6, at 90, 126; 1 SHALOWITZ, supra note 49, at 89–90.  
 55. A.though the boundary between public and private property on ocean shores may be 
especially difficult to ascertain, there are other boundaries that also are unclear and costly to 
specify. Inland boundaries may be unclear and costly to ascertain, and identifying boundaries in 
intellectual property may entail search costs. Stewart E. Sterk, Property Rules, Liability Rules 
and Uncertainty About Property Rights, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1285, 1296–99 (2008). 
 56. 448 A.2d 728 (R.I. 1982). 
 57. Id. at 729.  
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between private and public property is the mean high tide line, the 
Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the trespass 
charges.58 The court held that the boundary “is not readily identifiable 
by the casual observer”59 and that “due process provides that no man 
shall be held criminally responsible for conduct that he could not 
reasonably understand to be proscribed.”60 
Despite the current preference for an ambulatory legal boundary, the 
idea of fixing the boundary along the shores is not unknown.61 
Reminiscent of Roman law, the common law provides two main options 
to address changes along ocean shores that affect the boundary.62 Under 
the doctrine of avulsion, after any changes to the shoreline deemed to be 
avulsive, the legal boundary remains the preexisting mean high water 
line.63 Second, under the doctrine of accretion,64 any changes deemed to 
be accretive cause the legal boundary to shift to the new mean high 
water line.65 Courts today exhibit a strong presumption for applying 
                                                                                                                     
 58. Id. at 732–33. 
 59. Id. at 732.  
 60. Id. at 733. For a fascinating discussion of State v. Ibbison and its implications for the 
beach, see Thompson, supra note 9; cf. Christie, supra note 2, at 35–36 (discussing the 
confusion even courts have with ambulatory seashore boundaries). Enforcement of trespass laws 
on the beach also has given rise to controversy in Florida. See Christie, supra note 2, at 34–36, 
and Crystal Dunes Owners Ass’n Inc. v. City of Destin, Florida, 476 F. App’x 180, 182 (11th 
Cir. 2012) (dismissing beachfront property owners’ procedural due process and equal protection 
challenges to a city policy refusing to enforce “trespass laws within twenty feet of the wet 
sand’s edge”). For background on the use of criminal trespass statutes, see THOMAS W. MERRILL 
& HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 369–71 (2d ed. 2012). We thank 
Donna Christie for referring us to the Crystal Dunes Owners case. 
 61. However, there could be legal obstacles to generically fixing the boundary between 
private and public trust property. Fixing the boundary might constitute a taking if, for example, 
fixing the boundary deprived landowners of the right to accretions. Christie, supra note 2, at 36–
37 (referring to the Justice Stewart’s dissent in Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290 (1967)). 
Also, state lawmakers could not fix the boundary that applied to federal grants of land. Id. at 36 
(drawing on Hughes v. Washington).  
 62. On the Roman law principles, see G. INST. 2.70, 2.71; and J. INST. 2.1.20, 2.1.21, 
2.1.23, 2.1.24. Epstein helpfully discusses the Roman law of alluvion and avulsion. Epstein, 
supra note 11, at 49–55; Richard A. Epstein, Playing by Different Rules? Property Rights in 
Land and Water, in PROPERTY IN LAND AND OTHER RESOURCES 317, 319, 321, 342 (Daniel H. 
Cole & Elinor Ostrom eds., 2012).  
 63. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 
2599 (2010) (noting that following “an avulsive event[,] . . . the boundary between littoral 
property and sovereign land does not change; it remains (ordinarily) what was the mean high-
water line before the event”). 
 64. As noted above, we use the term “accretion” to encompass both accretion and erosion. 
See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 65. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2598 (“In Florida, as at common law, the 
littoral owner automatically takes title to dry land added to his property by accretion . . . .”); 
FLUSHMAN, supra note 6, at 96. Apart from situations deemed avulsion, there are other 
exceptions where accretive changes may not lead to a change in the boundary. See id. at 96–97, 
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accretion and preserving an ambulatory boundary.66 A leading treatise 
on water boundaries goes so far as to suggest that “there is some 
question as to whether”  “the doctrine of avulsion applies to open coast 
lands,” indicating that “[i]n California there are no reported cases, and 
one court in Texas has expressed the view that the rule of avulsion may 
not apply to the tidal coastline.”67 Florida applies the doctrine of 
avulsion to the coasts,68 but even Florida seems to presume a migratory 
boundary.69 
Even if avulsion applies to coastal shores in a state, the distinction 
between it and accretion is not always clear, which leaves the courts 
scope to characterize changes as accretion and thus maintain a 
migratory boundary. Doctrinally, accretion and erosion encompass 
“gradual and imperceptible” changes to the land.70 Accretion refers to 
                                                                                                                     
129–34.  
 66. There are many references to the contemporary presumption in favor of accretion and 
erosion and the resulting migratory boundary, as compared with avulsion and the fixed 
boundary that it brings. E.g., FLUSHMAN, supra note 6, at 100, 134–35; Christie, supra note 2, at 
27; Sax, supra note 11, at 346, 354; cf. Kalo, supra note 49, at 1440–44 (concluding that North 
Carolina, by statute, abandoned the avulsion rule and consequently that the legal boundary 
between private and public trust property ambulates in accordance with the mean high tide line 
regardless of the reason for the shift). 
 67. FLUSHMAN, supra note 6, at 134 (footnote omitted).  A 2012 decision of the Texas 
Supreme Court provides further evidence of the strong legal preference for a migrating 
boundary between private and public trust property. Severance v. Patterson, 370 S.W.3d 705 
(Tex. 2012). The issue in the case was whether, after a hurricane, a public beachfront access 
easement on a privately owned portion of the dry beach rolled landward onto another parcel of 
private property that was never burdened by an easement. Id. at 708. The majority held that the 
public beachfront access easement did not roll landward onto the other parcel because the 
change to the shore was avulsion. Id. at 724–25. In the course of holding that the easement did 
not roll, the majority indicated that “[t]he division between public and private ownership 
remains at the mean high tide line in the wake of naturally occurring changes, and even when 
boundaries seem to change suddenly.” Id. at 725. It also indicated that “[w]e have never applied 
the avulsion doctrine to upset the mean high tide line boundary.” Id. at 722. However in a 
footnote, the majority suggested that it was not definitively deciding that avulsion would never 
freeze the boundary between private and public trust property. After it indicated that “[s]ome 
states apply avulsion to determine that the mean high tide line as it existed before the avulsive 
event remains the boundary between public and private ownership of beach property after the 
avulsive event,” the majority stated that “[w]e have not accepted such an expansive view of the 
doctrine, but we need not make that determination in this case.” Id. at 722 n.20. 
 68. FLUSHMAN, supra note 6, at 134; Christie, supra note 13, at 27; see also Siesta Props., 
Inc. v. Hart, 122 So. 2d 218, 223–24 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960) (applying avulsion to islands); 
Cinque Bambini P’ship v. State, 491 So. 2d 508, 520 (Miss. 1986) (applying avulsion to 
artificially induced changes); City of Long Branch v. Jui Yung Liu, 4 A.3d 542, 552–54 (N.J. 
2010) (applying avulsion to beach renourishment). 
 69. Mun. Liquidators, Inc. v. Tench, 153 So. 2d 728, 731 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963) 
(“[T]here is a presumption of accretion or erosion as against avulsion.”); accord Schulz v. City 
of Dania, 156 So. 2d 520, 521 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963); see also FLUSHMAN, supra note 6, at 
99–100; Christie, supra note 2, at 28 n.54.  
 70. FLUSHMAN, supra note 6, at 92–93. 
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gradual and imperceptible “deposition[s]” to the shore,71 and erosion to 
“the gradual and imperceptible wearing away or loss of littoral or 
riparian land by the action of the water.”72 Avulsion refers to “the rapid, 
perceptible, and often violent removal of or addition to land due to the 
action of water, or the sudden and perceptible change in the physical 
location of the boundary watercourse.”73 The neat doctrinal distinction 
between “gradual and imperceptible” and “rapid, perceptible, and often 
violent” changes is not straightforward in practice.74 Indeed, there are 
some strongly counterintuitive holdings, such as a Texas decision that 
found changes following hurricanes, which seem sudden and violent, 
were properly characterized as erosion.75  
When upland private landowners lose property because the changes 
are legally treated as accretion, the state acquires the property subject to 
the public trust. However, the state is not required to compensate private 
landowners for the loss of their land. To quote Professor Peter Byrne, 
“[a]ccretionary loss has never been considered a taking, constitutionally 
requiring public compensation because nature, rather than the state, 
effects the deprivation. Loss of littoral land through accretion might be 
                                                                                                                     
 71. FLUSHMAN, supra note 6, at 92. Accretion was historically distinguished from 
“reliction,” which occurs when “lands once covered by water . . . become dry when the water 
recedes.” Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 
2598 (2010). Reliction and accretion generally receive the same treatment by courts. FLUSHMAN, 
supra note 6, at 97; see also Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2598 (referring “to 
accretions and relictions collectively as accretions”). Flushman indicates that “[t]he process of 
reliction is not one associated with lands along the open coast.” FLUSHMAN, supra note 6, at 
133. 
 72. FLUSHMAN, supra note 6, at 93. “Littoral property abuts the sea or a lake, while 
riparian property abuts rivers.” Sax, supra note 11, at 306 n.3. 
 73. FLUSHMAN, supra note 6, at 94 (footnote omitted); see also Stop the Beach 
Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2598.  
 74. For discussion of the difficulty of distinguishing between accretive and avulsive 
changes, see Southern Center of Theosophy Inc. v. South Australia [1982] ACLR 706, 721 
(Austl.) (“Since there is a logical, and practical, gap or ‘grey area’ between what is 
imperceptible and what is to be considered as ‘avulsion,’ the issue of imperceptibility or 
otherwise was always considered to be a jury question . . . .”); Attorney-General v. M’Carthy 
[1911] 2 I.R. 260, 296 (Ir.) (“The difficulty is, [w]hat is the unit or measure of time for ‘gradual 
and imperceptible’? . . . . Justinian and Bracton attempt no definition.”); FLUSHMAN, supra note 
6, at 98–99 (discussing the difficulty); Sax, supra note 11, at 343–46 (discussing the Supreme 
Court’s broadening of “the definition of accretion”); A. Dan Tarlock, Takings, Water Rights, 
and Climate Change, 36 VT. L. REV. 731, 745 (2012) (“The distinction [between 
‘accretion/erosion and avulsion’] is often hard to discern.”). 
 75. City of Corpus Christi v. Davis, 622 S.W.2d 640, 646 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981) 
(“[E]rosion can be both sudden and perceptible, and does not have to be always gradual and 
imperceptible”). In holding that the changes were not avulsive, the Texas court also emphasized 
that there were several causes of changes along the shore, not all of which were hurricanes. Id.; 
see also Christie, supra note 2, at 52 n.229. For a judicial reference to a hurricane as an example 
of avulsion, see City of Long Branch v. Jui Yung Liu, 4 A.3d 542, 551 (N.J. 2010). 
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understood to be a risk that ‘inheres in the title’ to such land.”76 
II.  RATIONALES FOR AN AMBULATORY COASTAL BOUNDARY 
 This Part turns to the reasons why an ambulatory coastal boundary 
is likely efficient. We begin by analyzing five existing rationales for a 
migratory boundary and arguing that they can be understood in 
efficiency terms. Then we offer our own explanation for why a 
migratory boundary likely is efficient, drawing on themes that emerge 
from considering the existing rationales. 
A.  Existing Rationales 
In a recent article, Professor Joseph Sax helpfully returns to the 
English and American historical authorities discussing the rules of 
accretion and avulsion “in an effort to understand something about how 
and why they developed as they did, with the hope that greater 
understanding might ultimately generate better outcomes.”77 His 
analysis indicates that various rationales have been offered over the 
centuries for accretion, and our discussion in this section is indebted to 
his masterful efforts bringing together the authorities.78  
Below we show that five rationales for accretion either identified by 
Sax or present in the materials that he discusses each can be understood 
in economic terms to reflect a concern with promoting efficiency.  This 
Article does not suggest that the various authorities that deployed these 
rationales were solely concerned with promoting efficiency or even 
consciously interested in promoting efficiency. Nor does this Article 
argue that a shift in the legal boundary to accord with natural changes 
will result in an efficient outcome in every case. We contend, however, 
that these five rationales reflect a concern with promoting efficiency, 
and thus that efficiency is an underlying, if unarticulated, justification 
                                                                                                                     
 76. Byrne, supra note 11, at 80 (quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 
1029 (1992)); see also id. at 100; Tarlock, supra note 74, at 741; Titus, supra note 8, at 1339 
(“An invasion by the sea due to natural factors is not a constitutional taking.”) (citing Cinque 
Bambini Partnership v. State, 491 So. 2d 508, 519–20 (Miss. 1986) (en banc)); id. at 1286, 
1371–84, 1388–91. Titus cautions that “some states may be waiving” their “common law right 
to require shorefront owners to abandon property as shores erode.” Id. at 1376.  
For a contrasting perspective, see Hiatt, supra note 25, at 372 (suggesting that there might 
be a taking when, due to sea level rise, governments acquire newly submerged private lands 
pursuant to the public trust doctrine, but arguing “that it should not be considered a taking when 
a state takes title or asserts control over private lands submerged due to climate change and 
large-scale sea level rise”). 
 77. Sax, supra note 11, at 307–08. For a useful discussion of the Roman authorities, see 
Epstein, supra note 11, at 47–57. 
 78. Other sources provide similar lists of rationales for the doctrine of accretion, generally 
drawing on modern U.S. law. See, e.g., 9 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 31, at 
§ 66.01[3]; Beck, supra note 35, at 431–39; Christie, supra note 2, at 28–29. 
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for an ambulatory boundary between private and public trust property.79  
                                                                                                                     
 79. In a recent article, Professor Thomas Merrill offers an efficiency explanation for the 
principle of accession, for which he believes the doctrine of accretion is an example. Merrill, 
supra note 11, at 465–66.  Merrill uses accretion to refer specifically to the doctrine “that a 
riparian landowner whose land is gradually augmented by alluvial formations owns the newly 
formed land,” not broadly as we do in this Article to encompass the legal rules of accretion and 
erosion. Id. at 465.  Professor Merrill argues that the principle of accession is an alternative to 
“first possession” “for establishing original ownership” and defines the principle in these terms: 
“When new resources are discovered or changes in relative values cause previously ignored 
questions of ownership to become salient, the newly discovered or newly salient resource is 
awarded to the person who owns as property some other resource prominently connected with 
the newly discovered or salient thing.” Id. at 463.  
Our analysis suggests that the doctrine of accretion as applied on the nation’s coastal shores 
is not best understood as an example of the principle of accession, interpreted “as a principle of 
acquisition.” MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 60, at 170 (indicating that the casebook “explore[s] 
the principle of accession as a principle of acquisition but” that “[a]ccession can be seen as 
defining the scope of property claims”); see also Merrill, supra note 11, at 481 (contrasting the 
two understandings of accession). Rather than a principle for awarding ownership to a new 
resource, accretion is one of the legal rules for drawing boundary lines between private and 
public landholdings in response to continuous physical changes on the coasts, with erosion 
being another important rule. Our understanding of accretion as a rule of boundary 
determination suggests that it may be serving the function of “defining the scope of property 
claims,” to use the language of MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 60, at 170.   
In a law review article from the 1960s, Professor Robert Beck rejects the idea of 
analogizing accretion to accession. Beck, supra note 35, at 432. Influenced by his work, we 
believe that there are two difficulties with Professor Merrill’s analysis of accretion as accession. 
First, the analysis presumes that when land is added to the shore, there is only a single 
landowner to whom the land could be assigned because there is only a single landowner who 
can claim to be “prominently connected” to the new land through an existing resource. Merrill, 
supra note 11, at 463; see also id. at 466 (“[T]he new soil always goes to the riparian owner on 
whose banks the new land is attached, who readily can be said to have the most prominent 
relationship to it.”); MERRILL & SMITH , supra note 60, at 183 (discussing “the logic” behind 
thinking “of accretion as an example of the principle of accession”). However, when land is 
added to the coast there will be two potential owners: the private landowner who owns the 
upland property, and the state that owns the wet beach and submerged lands in trust for the 
public. There is no reason to think that only the private landowner is prominently connected to 
the new land.  Beck, supra note 35, at 432 (“[W]hy should the alluvion belong to the owner of 
the contiguous land instead of to the owner of the bed? Was it not ‘acceding’ or ‘accreting’ or 
‘adding’ just as much to the bed as to the contiguous land?”). Indeed, we might think that the 
state, as the owner of the submerged lands on behalf of the public, has a greater claim to the 
accreted land than the private landowner because the newly added sediment might have come 
from the state-owned submerged lands. See Christie, supra note 2, at 28 (excerpting JOSEPH K. 
ANGELL, A TREATISE ON THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY IN TIDE WATERS, AND IN THE SOIL AND SHORES 
THEREOF 68 (Harrison Gray ed., 1826)). As Beck argues, “[T]here must have been something 
more than simply the theory of analogy to accession that led to preferring the riparian owner 
over the owner of the bed.” Beck, supra note 35, at 432. For a decision that illustrates the 
presence of two landowners, see United States v. Milner, 583 F.3d 1174 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(protecting the tideland owner’s right to an ambulatory boundary). 
Second, analyzing the doctrine of accretion as an instance of accession overlooks the 
existence of its companion, the doctrine of erosion, and the legal presumption in favor of 
accretion and erosion and against avulsion. Accretion, erosion, and this presumption help to 
ensure that the boundary line between private and public property generally migrates along with 
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One longstanding rationale for an ambulatory boundary is that 
gradual and imperceptible changes to the shoreline likely have a “de 
minimis impact.”80 This rationale does not easily explain cases where 
courts apply accretion but shift the ownership of sizeable parcels of 
land.81 Nonetheless, the idea that the legal boundary should track de 
minimis changes reflects a concern with efficiency. If the change 
wrought by nature is genuinely negligible, then the change should not 
affect the value of either the private or the public trust property. 
Moreover, because identifying the current ordinary high water mark is 
simpler than specifying the historic ordinary high water mark, shifting 
the legal boundary to accord with the current ordinary high water mark 
also should reduce administrative costs.82  
A second longstanding rationale for a shifting boundary is that 
accretion results in a “lost boundary.”83 The idea “is that where 
accretion or reliction [and erosion] occurred very slowly over a very 
long time, there was no longer evidence or knowledge of the location of 
the original boundary.”84 As with the de minimis rationale, it may be 
hard to explain the cases using the lost boundary rationale because 
courts seem to have shifted the boundary even where the old border was 
knowable.85 Regardless of whether it makes sense of the case law, in 
                                                                                                                     
physical changes along the shores. The doctrine of accretion necessarily allocates new land to 
the upland private owner, but this is incidental to the doctrine’s larger role in implementing a 
migratory boundary. As we emphasize, the migratory boundary that accretion helps to achieve is 
likely to be efficient along the coast because of the importance of maintaining private and public 
water adjacency and the administrative advantages of aligning the legal boundary with the status 
quo on the beach. Analyzing accretion as a “principle of acquisition” obscures accretion’s role 
as a rule of boundary determination that fosters a migrating border between private and public 
landowners on the beach to the benefit of both sides. 
 80. Sax, supra note 11, at 320; see also 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *262 
(noting the accretion rule applies because “de minimis non curat lex”). Professor Joseph Sax 
notes that the de minimis rationale was “cast away” by the court in The King v. Lord 
Yarborough, (1824) 107 Eng. Rep. 668 (K.B.); 3 B. & C. 91. Sax, supra note 11, at 332. 
However, there are later references in case law to the de minimis rationale. S. Ctr. of Theosophy 
Inc. v. South Australia [1982] ACLR 706, 721 (Austl.). 
 81. Notably, Professor Sax offers a way to reconcile the de minimis rationale and shifting 
the ownership of sizeable parcels of land. According to his reading, early English cases found 
accretion where the land at issue was “de minimis in terms of sovereign interest, even if not de 
minimis in monetary value or acreage.” Sax, supra note 11, at 329. Indeed, “the amounts of land 
in controversy were . . . often substantial in size.” Id. at 313. For example, in Lord Yarborough’s 
case, the court found accretion where “alluvion . . . had gradually filled a salt marsh of 453 
acres.” Id. at 330–31.  
 82. See COLE, supra note 51, at 93–104 (discussing how to find historic shoreline 
boundaries); FLUSHMAN, supra note 6, at 135–38 (same). 
 83. Sax, supra note 11, at 313. Professor Sax notes that the lost boundary rationale was 
“cast away” alongside the de minimis rationale in Lord Yarborough’s case. Id. at 332. 
 84. Id. at 312. For a definition of reliction, see supra note 71. 
 85. Beck, supra note 35, at 433 (“[T]here are many cases involving fixed boundaries 
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economic terms the lost boundary rationale reflects a concern with 
minimizing administrative costs. Aligning the legal boundary with the 
natural boundary of the current mean high water line avoids the 
difficulty of ascertaining an historic borderline, when evidence and 
knowledge of it have been lost or would be costly to acquire because of 
the passage of time.86 In other words, an ambulatory boundary offers 
another example of the pervasive influence of information costs in 
property law emphasized by Professor Henry Smith and Professor 
Thomas Merrill.87  
A third rationale for a shifting coastal boundary is what Professor 
Sax terms the “reciprocity rationale.”88 The idea is that the private 
landowner should receive the benefit of any additions because the 
landowner also bears the risk of any reduction, and vice versa.89 
Blackstone includes the reciprocity rationale in his discussion of 
accretion and avulsion.90 The U.S. Supreme Court explained the 
                                                                                                                     
which could be identified without great difficulty after a shift in the water line that hold that the 
accretion doctrine applies.”); see, e.g., Att’y-Gen. v. M’Carthy [1911] 2 I.R. 260, 276, 294 (Ir.) 
(title shifted even though the old boundary may have been knowable); S. Ctr. of Theosophy Inc. 
v. South Australia [1982] A.C. 706, 716 (Austl.) (“The authorities . . . . have firmly laid down 
that where land is granted with a water boundary, the title of the grantee extends to that land as 
added to or detracted from by accretion, or diluvion, and that this is so whether or not the grant 
is accompanied by a map showing the boundary, or contains a parcels clause stating the area of 
the land, and whether or not the original boundary can be identified.”). Professor Sax argues that 
the decision in Attorney-General v. M’Carthy indicates “that by the early twentieth century, the 
lost-boundary theory had been decisively rejected” in the English courts. Sax, supra note 11, at 
335.  
 86. See COLE, supra note 51, at 93–104 (discussing the determination of historic 
boundaries). 
 87. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Making Coasean Property More 
Coasean, 54 J. L. & ECON. S77, S90–91, S95, S98–99 (2011). For a definition of information 
costs, see Smith, Property and Property Rules, supra note 3, at 1768 (“Information costs include 
the cost of producing and verifying information about the scope and security of rights.”). 
 88. Sax, supra note 11, at 312, 340. The rationale is also called “the compensation theory” 
or “equity theory.” Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313, 326 (1973), overruled on other 
grounds by Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363 (1977); 
FLUSHMAN, supra note 6, at 253; 9 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 31, at § 66.01[3]. 
 89. Sax, supra note 11, at 312, 320; Byrne, supra note 11, at 95. 
 90. Specifically, Blackstone says:  
And as to lands gained from the sea, either by alluvion, by the washing up of 
sand and earth, so as in time to make terra firma; or by dereliction, as when the 
sea shrinks back below the usual watermark; in these cases the law is held to 
be, that if this gain be by little and little, by small and imperceptible degrees, it 
shall go to the owner of the land adjoining. For de minimis non curat lex: and, 
besides, these owners being often losers by the breaking in of the sea, or at 
charges to keep it out, this possible gain is therefore a reciprocal consideration 
for such possible charge or loss.  
2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *261–62 (footnote omitted). 
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rationale in the following terms in the late nineteenth century:  
The riparian right to future alluvion is a vested 
right. . . . The maxim “qui sentit onus debet sentire 
commodum” lies at its foundation. The owner takes the 
chances of injury and of benefit arising from the situation 
of the property. If there be a gradual loss, he must bear it; if 
a gradual gain, it is his.91  
There are several ways of understanding the reciprocity rationale. 
One might understand it as a justice (or fairness) based rationale, 
reflecting the idea that a lottery in which there is an equal probability of 
winning or losing is “fair.”92 Although the Court did not explicitly state 
in the above quoted passage that there is an equal probability of a gain 
or loss, it seems implicit in doctrinal expositions of the rationale.93  
The reciprocity rationale also can be understood in economic terms 
as promoting efficiency. Property rights help to overcome the “tragedy 
of the commons” because they internalize onto owners the gains and 
losses that result from their management decisions.94 By assigning 
                                                                                                                     
 91. Cnty. of St. Clair v. Lovingston, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 46, 68–69 (1874). The Supreme 
Court also mentioned the reciprocity rationale in an earlier decision. Mayor of New Orleans v. 
United States, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 662, 717 (1836).  
Professors Powell and Wolf indicate that the rationale “has received only modest judicial 
support.” 9 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 31, at § 66.01[3]. However, the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals recently invoked the reciprocity rationale to protect the interests of a 
Native American tribe in tidelands held in trust for it by the United States. United States v. 
Milner, 583 F.3d 1174, 1186–88 (9th Cir. 2009). The court reasoned that, just as upland owners 
are entitled to gains from accretion because they also run the risk of losing land to erosion, so 
the tideland owner also “has a vested right in the potential gains that accrue from the movement 
of the boundary line.” Id. at 1187–88. 
 92. See, e.g., Milner, 583 F.3d at 1188 (referring to reciprocity as “the fairness rationale”); 
City of Long Branch v. Jui Yung Liu, 4 A.3d 542, 550 (N.J. 2010) (“The doctrine of accretion 
and erosion is founded ‘on the principle of natural justice’ . . . .”); S. Ctr. of Theosophy Inc. v. 
South Australia [1982] A.C. 706, 716 (Austl.) (referring to the idea that a landowner takes 
subject to “subtractions and additions” as “fair,” “convenient,” and “founded in justice”); Byrne, 
supra note 25, at 633 (“One can understand the intuitive justice, all other things being equal, of 
allowing party A to obtain the benefit of random shifts in property boundaries if party A must 
tolerate losses from the same risk.”).  
On the idea of a “fair lottery,” see Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Just 
Lotteries, 27 SOC. SCI. INFO. 483, 485–92 (1988). Kornhauser and Sager state:  
In the very idea of a “fair” coin or die there inheres the element that drives our 
naive view of what makes a lottery itself fair, equiprobability: when and only 
when a lottery’s payoff condition gives each member of the pool an objectively 
equal chance to receive the benefit do we think of the lottery as fair.  
Id. at 485.  
 93. See, e.g., Bonelli Cattle Co., 414 U.S. at 326. 
 94. For discussion of the internalization function of property, see Merrill, supra note 11, 
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territorial gains and losses to owners, a rule that the legal boundary 
generally moves with natural forces may incentivize owners to make 
socially optimal investment decisions about their parcels by putting 
owners on notice that the size of their parcels will vary with changes 
wrought by nature. How owners respond to the risks of territorial gains 
or losses will depend on their attitudes toward risk. If there truly is an 
equal probability of a loss or a gain, risk-neutral owners will make 
decisions regarding their land unaffected by the risk of losing or gaining 
property. If the owners are risk averse, however, they will likely focus 
on the possibility of losing a part of the parcel, and accordingly reduce 
investment in the property, or invest in protection measures.95 Risk-
preferring owners might actively invest in coastal property.  
A fourth rationale for an ambulatory coastal boundary is that shifting 
the border may reward a littoral landowner for putting any accreted 
property to use. The idea that underlies “the use/prescription theory,”96 
as Professor Sax calls it, is “that when the pace of change is very 
gradual, the adjacent owner effectively takes over the newly exposed 
land unperceived and uses it as his own.”97 The notion that use of land 
should be remunerated could be understood in Lockean terms as a 
reward for labor,98 but there is also an efficiency dimension to 
rewarding use. It may incentivize landowners to put land to productive 
use, which might encourage economic development and growth. As the 
House of Lords explained in Lord Yarborough’s case, “This custom is 
beneficial to the public. Much land which would remain for years, 
perhaps for ever [sic], barren, is in consequence of this custom rendered 
productive as soon as it is formed.”99 Further, the transfer of title will 
                                                                                                                     
at 494, and Smith, Property and Property Rules, supra note 3, at 1755.  
 95. Professor Steven Shavell explains that “[r]isk aversion is most relevant in situations in 
which losses would be large in relation to a person’s assets and thus would impinge 
substantially on his utility. . . . If, however, losses would be modest relative to a person’s assets, 
he would be likely to display a roughly risk-neutral attitude toward them.” STEVEN SHAVELL, 
FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 258 (2004). Experimental findings suggest that 
many people are risk averse. Charles A. Holt & Susan K. Laury, Risk Aversion and Incentive 
Effects, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 1644, 1653–54 (2002). 
 96. Sax, supra note 11, at 325. Professors Powell and Wolf refer to this as the 
“productivity or efficiency theory.” 9 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 35, at § 66.01[3].  
 97. Sax, supra note 11, at 323 (discussing the conclusion of Robert Callis, one of the 
earliest English commentators on moving water boundaries). 
 98. Gifford v. Lord Yarborough, (1828) 130 Eng. Reg. 1023 (H.L.) 1024; 5 Bing. 163, 
165–66 (U.K.) (quoting philosopher John Locke in support of the idea that a private landowner 
should be granted title to land added to his property through the deposit of alluvion). 
 99. Id. at 166. Professors Powell and Wolf describe this passage as “[t]he clearest 
statement of the efficiency argument.” 9 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 31, at 
§ 66.01[3] n.32.  
Beck discusses a statement of “the ‘productivity’ theory” in Jefferis v. East Omaha Land 
Co., 134 U.S. 178 (1890). Beck, supra note 35, at 434 & n.27. This passage from Jefferis states 
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reward the private landowner without imposing significant costs on the 
losing party, namely, the state. The state will probably not be making 
much, if any, use of the land by the time of the transfer if the winning 
landowner has been using the land.100 To the extent that the 
“use/prescription” rationale emphasizes the lack of a loss to the state, it 
blends with the de minimis rationale.101  
It is not clear, however, that the use/prescription theory explains the 
modern preference for an ambulatory boundary.102 The theory reflects a 
dated policy in favor of active use. Today society recognizes that 
nonuse of land, including coastal land, also may be efficient.103 In 
addition, the rationale cannot explain the entire range of circumstances 
when the boundary migrates. It might explain why the boundary 
ambulates when an upland parcel is enlarged through the addition of 
land (accretion in its narrow sense) because in this situation the private 
owner may have the opportunity to use the new parcel. But the rationale 
does not explain why the boundary ambulates when the private 
landowner loses part of his parcel through erosion, because there is no 
opportunity for private use when land is lost.  
A fifth rationale for an ambulatory boundary is that it simultaneously 
preserves the private landowner’s “proximity [. . .] to the water”104 and 
                                                                                                                     
that “it is the interest of the community that all lands should have an owner, and most 
convenient that insensible additions to the shore should follow the title to the shore.” Jefferis, 
134 U.S. at 191. Earlier in Jefferis, the almost identical language is used in a quotation from 
Banks v. Ogden, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 57, 67 (1865)). Id. at 189. Professor Sax suggests that the 
passage from Banks might allude to the water adjacency rationale. Sax, supra note 11, at 348 & 
n.241. 
 100. Professor Sax suggests another reason why awarding the land to the private landowner 
may not be costly for the state: “The gradualness of the process also diminishes the sense of loss 
by the loser.” Sax, supra note 11, at 324.  
The use/prescription theory is interesting in light of the traditional common law 
“presumption that adverse possession does not apply to the government.” MERRILL & SMITH, 
supra note 60, at 202; see also id. (noting that some states have “modified” or “abolished” the 
presumption against adverse possession of government owned lands). 
 101. See Beck, supra note 35, at 434 (suggesting that “the ‘productivity’ theory” and “the 
de minimis theory . . . are in fact one”); Sax, supra note 11, at 342 (suggesting that the 
use/prescription rationale approaches the de minimis rationale in stating that “[h]aving happened 
so insensibly, the change is not perceived as having changed the status quo ante, and is thus 
effectively de minimis.”). 
 102. See Christie, supra note 2, at 29 (“The primary value of riparian or littoral land is not 
that it may produce more land, and the policy for recognizing the right to accreted land is not to 
encourage the filling of submerged land or creation of more land, but to provide access to the 
water.” (footnote omitted)). 
 103. For example, preserving or rebuilding wetlands or dunes may help communities better 
withstand the effects of climate change. Byrne, supra note 11, at 87, 93; see also Ruhl & 
Salzman, supra note 33, at 230–37 (arguing for recognition of economic value of the nonuse of 
coastal land under the public trust doctrine). 
 104. Sax, supra note 11, at 308 n.8 (citing FLUSHMAN, supra note 6, at 253). 
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the public’s access to the water.105 Preservation of the private 
landowner’s adjacency to the water is likely efficient because “water-
adjacency is central to the value and use of riparian/littoral property.”106 
Protection of the public’s access to the water is also likely efficient 
because of the value of public access to tidal and navigable waters for 
navigation, recreation, commerce, fishing, and other purposes. Case law 
refers to the protection of the private owner’s water adjacency as a 
rationale for an ambulatory boundary.107 Indeed, Professor Sax and 
other commentators seem to agree that preservation of the private 
owner’s adjacency to the shore underlies the modern preference for an 
ambulatory boundary.108 The ability of the ambulatory boundary to 
simultaneously safeguard the public’s access to the water seems less 
widely recognized.109  
To see how an ambulating boundary protects both private and public 
                                                                                                                     
 105. Professor Eagle indicates that “the basic proposition of the [public trust] doctrine 
[is] that the public has the right to access and to use public waterways.” EAGLE, supra note 5, at 
185 (emphasis omitted). 
 106. Sax, supra note 11, at 313; see also FLUSHMAN, supra note 6, at 87; 9 POWELL ON 
REAL PROPERTY, supra note 31, at § 66.01[3]; Christie, supra note 2, at 21, 29; Kalo, supra note 
49, at 1436 n.27. 
 107. E.g., Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313, 326 (1973), overruled on other 
grounds by Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363 (1977); 
Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 293 (1967); Lamprey v. Metcalf, 53 N.W. 1139, 1142 
(Minn. 1893); Att’y-Gen. of S. Nigeria v. John Holt & Co. (Liverpool) [1915] A.C. 599, 612 
(P.C.) (appeal taken from S. Nigeria). 
 108. 9 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 31, at § 66.01[3]; Beck, supra note 35, at 
438; Kalo, supra note 49, at 1442–44; Sax, supra note 11, at 313, 347–48. Other sources refer to 
the benefits that an ambulatory boundary has for private landowners. See FLUSHMAN, supra note 
6, at 100; Christie, supra note 2, at 29.  
Professor Sax indicates that “none of the old cases or old writers” refer to preservation of 
water adjacency as a rationale to shift the legal boundary. Sax, supra note 11, at 326. He 
speculates that “[p]robably the reason our modern concern with riparian/littoral access to water 
was not a consideration in earlier times is that in those days, such land was used primarily as 
forage, rather than for boating or for access related to modern recreational use of the shore.” Id. 
at 347 (footnote omitted). Rose suggests that “[b]each recreation” came “into vogue” in the late 
eighteenth or early nineteenth century in England. See Rose, supra note 9, at 757. 
 109. Professor Sax refers to benefits that an ambulatory boundary has for the public as well 
as private landowners. Sax, supra note 11, at 353 (noting that “maintaining water adjacency for 
riparian/littoral landowners and assuring public use of overlying water (and some part of the 
foreshore) are the central goals of the law relating to migratory waters”); see also Titus, supra 
note 8, at 1370 (“When a shore retreats, the boundaries retreat—regardless of whether the 
erosion is natural or anthropogenic. Were it otherwise, the public trust rights, such as lateral 
beach access, would be routinely eliminated . . . .”).  
There also are references in case law to the benefits for the public of maintaining a 
migratory boundary. See, e.g., Bonelli Cattle Co., 414 U.S. at 318 (“In order for the States to 
guarantee full public enjoyment of their navigable watercourses, it has been held that their title 
to the bed of a navigable river mechanically follows the river’s gradual changes in course.” 
(footnote omitted)).  
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trust property, it is helpful to distinguish the effects of an ambulating 
boundary when land is added to the shore through accretion, and when 
land leaves the shore through erosion. When land is added to the shore, 
private landowners risk losing their adjacency to the sea if the new land 
becomes the property of the state. The new land could separate 
landowners’ property from the ocean.110 Giving landowners title 
preserves their adjacency to the ocean without interfering with the 
public’s interests in using the water and the wet beach that the public 
trust historically protects.111  
When the upland parcel is diminished through erosion, a landward 
shift of the legal boundary to accord with the new mean high water line 
diminishes the area under private control. But shifting the legal 
boundary does not remove the water adjacency that is central to the 
value of the private property, assuming that the landowner’s parcel is 
not entirely eroded.112 A shift in the legal boundary is probably 
necessary to preserve the public uses that make public trust property 
valuable.113 If the boundary remained the historic mean high water line, 
parts of the wet beach and tidal and navigable waters could come under 
private control, which would mean that private landowners could create 
                                                                                                                     
 110. “The effect of [the application of the avulsion rule to an increase to the beach] would 
be to destroy the littoral owner’s common law littoral rights, including the private littoral right 
of direct access to the ocean, and to create a ribbon of state-owned, dry sand beach.” Kalo, 
supra note 49, at 1442; see also Lamprey, 53 N.W. at 1142 (describing as “mischief[] . . . if a 
riparian owner is liable to be cut off from access to the water, and another owner sandwiched in 
between him and it”).  
 111. For an indication that the interests of the adjoining private and public landowners 
figure in judicial boundary determinations, see Bonelli, 414 U.S. at 328 (“[A]n analysis of the 
interests of the State and Bonelli [the private landowner,] . . . compels the conclusion that 
. . . title to the disputed land should be vested in Bonelli . . . . The State’s acquisition of the 
exposed land here could only be a windfall, since unnecessary to the State’s purpose in holding 
title to the beds of the navigable streams within its borders.”). 
As discussed further below, in some circumstances it may be possible to allocate “new 
land” to the public (using the doctrine of avulsion) without undermining the private landowner’s 
property values. For example, courts have deemed beach renourishment to be avulsion, thereby 
freezing the boundary at the pre-existing mean high water line and assigning the renourished 
beach to the public rather than the private owner. Beach renourishment may protect the value of 
private property because it reduces erosion. Also, renourishment programs may include 
measures to protect private owners’ access to, and views of, the water that reduce the impact on 
property values. City of Long Branch v. Jui Yung Liu, 4 A.3d 542, 553, 555 (N.J. 2010); 
Christie, supra note 2, at 42. 
 112. Natural forces can inflict significant losses on landowners. For example, part of the 
backdrop to Severance v. Patterson was that the “property” of Severance’s neighbor was 
“devastated” by Hurricane Rita. 370 S.W.3d 705, 712 (Tex. 2012). The hurricane “moved the 
line of vegetation landward” and left “[t]he entirety of the house on Severance’s Kennedy Drive 
property . . . seaward of the vegetation line. The State [of Texas] claimed a portion of her 
property was located on a public beachfront easement and a portion of her house interfered with 
the public’s use of the dry beach.” Id.  
 113. See, e.g., Rose, supra note 9, at 780. 
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barriers to the public using these areas for public trust uses such as 
navigation, commerce, and recreation. An important reason for the 
public trust over lands underlying tidal and navigable waters is that 
private owners of these areas might have an incentive to act as holdouts 
and block access for uses such as navigation and recreation that require 
consistent public access along long stretches.114  
Our discussion so far has focused on five existing rationales for an 
ambulatory boundary. While not all of these rationales provide 
satisfactory accounts of the existing case law, each demonstrates a 
concern with promoting efficiency.  
B.  The Efficiency of Migratory Coastal Boundaries 
We now turn to our own explanation of why the current legal 
preference for a migratory coastal boundary is likely efficient in present 
circumstances. Our explanation draws on the economic interpretations 
offered above of the five rationales for a migratory boundary.  
Our starting point is that the existing presumption in the law for an 
ambulatory boundary is efficient because it is sufficiently strong to 
constitute a reasonably clear rule.115 A clear legal rule provides parties 
with notice and enables them to adjust their behavior and investments. It 
should also minimize disputes.116 Of course, freezing the legal boundary 
at the historic mean high water line under the doctrine of avulsion also 
                                                                                                                     
 114. PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1230 (2012) (“A key justification for 
sovereign ownership of navigable riverbeds is that a contrary rule would allow private riverbed 
owners to erect improvements on the riverbeds that could interfere with the public’s right to use 
the waters as a highway for commerce.”); Epstein, supra note 33, at 415; Rose, supra note 9, at 
750. In Severance v. Patterson, the majority notes that fixing the boundary using avulsion may 
“allow[] private property owners to retain ownership of property that becomes submerged under 
the ocean.” 370 S.W.3d at 722 n.20; see also Jefferis v. E. Omaha Land Co., 134 U.S. 178, 189 
(1890). 
 115. Professor Sax alludes to the clarity benefits of the doctrines of accretion and avulsion. 
Sax, supra note 11, at 348 n.241 (“[T]he accretion/avulsion rule is designed to identify a clear 
owner according to a specified set of rules.”). 
We describe the presumption for an ambulatory boundary as “a reasonably clear rule” 
because there remains the possibility that rather than applying accretion, a court might apply the 
doctrine of avulsion, which fixes the legal boundary at the historic mean high water line. We do 
not intend to imply that there are no controversies about whether a physical change along the 
shore should alter the legal boundary between private and public landowners. See Sax, supra 
note 11, at 351 (indicating that “the deeply rooted doctrinal ‘accretion/avulsion’ 
distinction . . . continues to generate a good deal of wasteful litigation”). 
 116. See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 21–36 
(1995); Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of Determining Property Rights, 
14 J. LEGAL STUD. 13, 14 (1985) (“[L]ow-cost mechanical entitlement-determination rules play 
an important role in facilitating the exchange and modification of property rights . . . .”); Robert 
H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 
88 YALE L.J. 950, 969–71 (1979) (discussing the implications of “vague” legal rules for “private 
ordering”). 
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would be a clear rule that would provide notice and presumably reduce 
disputes. But freezing the legal boundary would sacrifice the benefits of 
shifting the boundary to accord with natural changes.  
Two benefits of an ambulatory boundary are particularly important 
from an economic point of view. The first is the opportunity that a 
migratory boundary affords to preserve the water adjacency of private 
landowners, while simultaneously maintaining public access to the wet 
beach and tidal and navigable waterways. We have already discussed 
this advantage and will not repeat the points made above. The second 
important benefit is the administrative advantages of defining the legal 
boundary as the contemporary mean high water line rather than a 
historic mean high water line. We will elaborate on these administrative 
advantages because, while there are allusions to them in the case law 
and commentary, we have not come across an extensive treatment of 
them.117 Nonetheless, simultaneously preserving private water 
adjacency and public access to the water and the wet beach likely is a 
more important reason for the preference for a migratory boundary than 
the administrative advantages of such a boundary. The greater 
importance of the former is suggested by the judicial willingness to 
maintain a migratory boundary even when the historical boundary is 
knowable, and the administrative advantages of aligning the natural and 
the legal boundaries are less evident.118  
To grasp the administrative advantages of an ambulatory boundary, 
it is useful to keep in mind that while there may be situations where the 
historical boundary is marked, the historical boundary will most likely 
be unknown.119 If a dispute arises where a historical boundary is 
marked, it might be easier to enforce that historical boundary than to 
undertake a survey to determine a boundary based on the current mean 
                                                                                                                     
 117. See, e.g., Siesta Props., Inc. v. Hart, 122 So. 2d 218, 222–23 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960) 
(reversing the trial court, which held that “the law of avulsion insofar as it is attempted to be 
applied in this case should be rejected as the law of Florida, partly . . . because of the 
impracticality of applying it intelligently”); Severance, 370 S.W.3d at 718 (“[T]he boundary 
remains fixed (relatively) at the mean high tide line. Any other approach would leave locating 
that boundary to pure guesswork.” (citation omitted)); S. Ctr. of Theosophy Inc. v. South 
Australia [1982] A.C. 706, 716 (Austl.) (“[I]t is manifestly convenient to continue to regard the 
boundary between land and water as being where it is from day to day or year to year.”); Byrne, 
supra note 11, at 81; Epstein, supra note 11, at 52 (awarding “alluvion” to riparian owners 
yields “low administrative costs”); Sax, supra note 11, at 347 n.234 (discussing S. Ctr. of 
Theosophy Inc. v. South Australia). 
 118. See supra note 85 and accompanying text (discussing judicial willingness to find 
accretion even where the historic boundary is knowable).  
 119. See, e.g., 1 SHALOWITZ, supra note 49, at 89–90; Thompson, supra note 9, at 358 
(“[T]o maintain accurate boundary markers on a beach face, the boundary would have to be 
resurveyed after every winter storm (when a beach can become lower, flatter, and wider as 
sediment is moved offshore) and even periodically during the calmer summer months (when the 
beach tends to gain sediment and height).”). 
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high water line.120 However, in the more likely case without a marked 
historical boundary, it will be less information intensive to determine 
the contemporary mean high water line boundary than to recreate a 
boundary based on a historical mean high water line.  
The difficulty in recreating a historical boundary is likely to be 
determining the shape of the landform at the desired point in the past. 
Historical tidal observations might be available to determine the vertical 
component of the historical boundary (the height of the mean high tide) 
because the federal government has monitored tides for over 150 
years.121 But it will be difficult to fix the point along the shore where the 
mean high water line historically intersected with the shore, because the 
landform will have changed in the interim. To recreate the shore as it 
stood in the past likely will require turning to old photographs, maps, 
surveys, and archival records that may not provide especially “accurate 
or precise” descriptions of the shore in the past.122 Even if a boundary 
can be determined based on a historical mean water line, there may be 
less confidence in the accuracy of this boundary than a boundary 
determined based on a contemporary survey applying data about the 
mean high water line to the current shore.123 Thus echoing a point made 
earlier in the discussion of the lost boundary rationale, the legal 
preference for a migratory boundary seems to be another illustration of 
the influence of information costs on property law.124 It is the difficulty 
of accessing information about preexisting landforms that complicates 
the administrative use of a fixed, historic boundary. 
We acknowledge that a migratory boundary has costs as well as 
benefits. One of the disadvantages is the lack of certainty that a 
migratory boundary provides private landowners and the public about 
where private ownership begins and public ownership ends when they 
walk along a beach, especially when the migratory boundary is the 
mean high water line as opposed to the more visible vegetation line.125 
As discussed earlier, the mean high water line is not a clear on/off 
signal. There are problems with policing trespassing by members of the 
                                                                                                                     
 120. One downside of applying the historical boundary is that it might distance one party 
from the ocean and result in a loss of water adjacency. 
 121. Christie, supra note 2, at 33. 
 122. FLUSHMAN, supra note 6, at 135–38. For a description of methods surveyors currently 
use, see COLE, supra note 51, at 93–104. 
 123. The difficulty of determining a historic vegetation line boundary is captured by an 
article discussing a 1966 Washington State Supreme Court decision that fixed the boundary 
between private and public trust property as the vegetation line of 1889. The article asks 
rhetorically, “The unanswered question remains: Can the vegetation line of 1889 in fact be 
determined? If so, how?” Corker, supra note 43, at 91. 
 124. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
 125. See Christie, supra note 2, at 72 (describing the “ocean boundaries” of “coastal land” 
as “indeterminable to laymen—both littoral owners and beach users”). 
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public onto private property in beach areas due to the uncertainty of the 
boundary. But the benefits to private landowners—as well as the 
public—of maintaining water adjacency and reducing the administrative 
costs of determining the boundary may offset the costs of impinging on 
the owner’s right to exclude stemming from the migratory mean high 
water line. These benefits might be especially salient in an era when 
coastal property is highly valued.126  
If a migrating boundary is efficient, why do legal decision makers 
sometimes freeze the boundary at a historic point, through statutes such 
as the Florida legislation that provides the backdrop to the Stop the 
Beach Renourishment case, or through common law decisions that 
employ the doctrine of avulsion? One possibility is that individual 
decisions to fix the boundary might be inefficient and dictated by 
notions of fairness or perhaps simply politics.127 But it is also possible 
that there may be circumstances where a fixed boundary is efficient 
even if a migratory boundary generally should be preferred on 
efficiency grounds.  
Consider the choice in Florida to fix the boundary between private 
and public trust property at the preexisting mean high tide line before 
undertaking beach renourishment that provided the backdrop for Stop 
the Beach Renourishment.128 This choice deprives private landowners of 
their immediate adjacency to the ocean because the renourished beach is 
interposed between privately owned land and the ocean, on public trust 
property seaward of the newly fixed boundary. But fixing the boundary 
                                                                                                                     
 126. See supra note 43 (referring to indications that rising coastal property values prompt 
greater precision in determining coastal boundaries); see also Parker v. New Hanover Cnty., 619 
S.E.2d 868, 871, 880 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (upholding an inlet relocation project to protect $600 
million of private coastal property). 
 127. Professor Byrne states that  
the avulsion-accretion distinction . . . . seems quite susceptible to judicial 
interpretation to reach desired results post-hoc, as the degree of perceptibility 
necessary for finding avulsion cannot be stated with any precision. Indeed, it 
may be the best rationale for the distinction that its vagaries allow courts to 
accomplish substantial justice post-hoc. 
Byrne, supra note 11, at 95. Case law supports the idea that avulsion provides the courts with a 
means of—as Professor Byrne puts it—“reach[ing] desired results post-hoc.” See Bonelli Cattle 
Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313, 327 (1973) (“The rationale for the doctrine of avulsion is a need 
to mitigate the hardship that a shift in title caused by a sudden movement of the river would 
cause the abutting landowners were the accretion principle to be applied.”), overruled on other 
grounds by Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363 (1977); 
id. at 328 (reaching a possibly post-hoc decision by balancing “the interests of the State and [the 
private landowner]” and finding that “[t]he State’s acquisition of the exposed land here could 
only be a windfall”). 
 128. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592 
(2010). 
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at the preexisting mean high tide line when undertaking beach 
renourishment may be efficient.129 First, the information problems that 
in general might make it hard for the courts and private and public 
landowners to fix the boundary at a historical line are unlikely to plague 
the fixing of the boundary in the context of beach renourishment. In this 
context the boundary is determined and fixed before the shape of the 
shore is physically altered by renourishment. Thus there is no need to go 
back to old photos, maps, or surveys to recreate the shore and define the 
point at which the horizontal plane of the mean high water line 
hypothetically would have intersected with land along the shore, 
because the shore is available for a survey before renourishment.130  
Second, fixing the boundary in the context of beach renourishment 
may protect the value of private and public trust property. Declines in 
private property values due to the loss of ocean adjacency may be offset 
by the protection that renourishment provides against declining property 
values due to erosion.131 The Florida statute also provides private 
landowners with protections to safeguard many of their traditional 
littoral rights that should help to reduce any diminution in their property 
values.132 Freezing the boundary benefits the public by providing it with 
access to the renourished beach, and as discussed above, public access 
to the beach has economic value. This public access might be regarded 
as a reward for investing in beach renourishment, an expensive 
                                                                                                                     
 129. See Christie, supra note 2, at 37 (describing beach renourishment of “critically 
eroding beaches or beaches that are retreating dramatically” as “one situation . . . where a fixed 
boundary is the most reasonable policy resolution and, if legislation is designed properly, should 
avoid constitutional problems”). 
 130. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. 130 S. Ct. 2592, 
2599 n.2 (2010) (assuming that “the [surveyed] erosion-control line is the pre-existing mean 
high-water line”); Christie, supra note 2, at 40–41 (indicating that the “erosion control line,” 
that becomes the fixed boundary, is established “[b]efore construction of a beach restoration 
project” and that the mean high water line “is the primary reference for . . . establish[ing] the 
erosion control line”). 
 131. City of Long Branch v. Jui Yung Liu refers to the benefits of renourishment for private 
upland owners. 4 A.3d 542, 545 (N.J. 2010) In this case a coastal landowner argued that the 
court should treat 225 feet of dry sand added to the beach in front of her property as accretion in 
its determination of just compensation in an eminent domain action. Id. 545. The court, holding 
that the replenishment constituted avulsion, noted that, by the time the case reached oral 
argument, the 225 feet of replenished beach already had eroded, and “[o]ne can only surmise 
what would have been the damage to the Lius’ property without the 225-foot buffer.” Id. at 553 
n.13; see also Christie, supra note 2, at 71 (“As a general proposition, the increase in value of 
property that was previously endangered by erosion and that would be protected and enhanced 
by a two-hundred-foot wide beach will offset the value of the right to accretions for property on 
a critically eroding beach.”). 
 132. Christie, supra note 2, at 42; see also Epstein, supra note 11, at 39, 43, 66–67 (arguing 
that Florida’s statutory scheme for beach renourishment provides in-kind compensation for the 
taking of littoral rights). 
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endeavor that may be “cost-effective,” at least in Florida,133 but that 
might not occur without guaranteeing public access to the renourished 
beach.134  
III.  MAINTAINING AN AMBULATORY BOUNDARY 
If an ambulatory boundary is efficient under current circumstances, 
should the boundary continue to migrate in a warming world? Sea levels 
will rise due to climate change; in turn, rising sea levels will push the 
mean high water line landward. As the line shifts, under the doctrine of 
erosion, the public trust will burden formerly upland private property 
and the public trust will expand at the expense of private property.135 
However, as mentioned above, the private property owners whose lands 
will be burdened will not be entitled to compensation.  
Recent scholarship raises the possibility that the rules of the game 
should change in a warming world, and that perhaps private owners 
whose land becomes subject to the public trust should receive 
compensation.136 These suggestions, which we have not seen fully 
articulated, seem based on the idea that it would be unjust to force 
landowners to bear the cost of the loss of territory, as they will no 
longer have the chance to enjoy gains in their holdings, because the 
likelihood of accretion is much diminished in a warming world where 
sea levels are rising.137 Thus the suggestions draw on a justice-based 
understanding of the reciprocity rationale for an ambulatory boundary, 
which justifies awarding any gains in land to private landowners 
because they face the downside risk of losses in land.138 These 
suggestions seem to reflect a belief that private landowners no longer 
face a “fair lottery”139 in a warming world where the mean high water 
                                                                                                                     
 133. Christie, supra note 2, at 38. 
 134. Byrne, supra note 11, at 94–95 (“States are unlikely to fund beach reconstruction 
projects if the new beaches are constitutionally required to be privately owned.”). 
 135. Byrne, supra note 25, at 626 (“Under traditional common law rules governing erosion, 
the migration of the mean high tide line will change ownership of locations from private owners 
to the public.”); see also Byrne, supra note 11, at 80, 100.  
For background on sea level rise and climate change, see, for example, Byrne, supra note 
11, at 73–76; Hiatt, supra note 25, at 374–77; and Titus, supra note 8, at 1298–300. See also 
COLE, supra note 51, at 24 (“During the last 100 years, sea-level monitoring has indicated a 
worldwide trend of continual rise in sea level.”). 
 136. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 137. See supra note 25.  
 138.  See Hiatt, supra note 25, at 384 (referring to the reciprocity rationale for accretion and 
erosion and arguing that these doctrines should not apply when boundaries shift due to sea level 
rise because “the doctrine [will] . . . consistently work to the detriment of private property 
owners”). However, Hiatt argues that “[i]t should not be considered a taking” when the 
government acquires control over newly submerged private lands due to sea level rise due to 
climate change, pursuant to the public trust doctrine. Id. at 385. 
 139. This term is borrowed from Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 92, at 492. 
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line is expected to shift unidirectionally landward. Similarly, it might be 
argued that tideland owners stand to reap an unfair windfall in a 
warming world on the basis that the right of tideland owners to gain 
property through erosion historically has been justified by the equal 
possibility that tideland owners lose property as dry land accretes to the 
shore.140 
The suggestions that private landowners receive compensation for 
the landward movement of the mean high water line raise two questions 
in Calabresi and Melamed’s terms.141 The first is whether the 
entitlement to the land that becomes seaward of the mean high water 
line should shift from the state to private landowners. Under current 
law, this shifting land becomes subject to the public trust. But the idea 
of compensating private landowners for the inland rolling of the public 
trust implicitly presumes that private landowners should continue to 
remain entitled to the shifting land. The entitlement would transfer to 
the public only after the payment of compensation. The second question 
concerns the remedy available to private landowners for the loss of their 
private parcels to rising seas. As explained above, under current law if 
private landowners lose land to the public trust they are not 
compensated for the loss of their rights, which means in effect that the 
loss remains where it falls.142 Compensating landowners for the loss 
would spread the loss across taxpayers.143 
We begin with the first question of whether the entitlement to the 
shifting land should shift from the state (on behalf of the public) to 
private landowners. We focus on whether the state or private 
landowners should be entitled to the land as a general rule. Our 
discussion presumes that decision makers have the legal authority to 
grant the shifting land to private landowners. However, the public trust 
doctrine might prevent lawmakers from allowing private landowners to 
acquire title to the shifting land because allowing them to do so might 
be regarded as alienating a portion of the land to which the public 
should retain access under the doctrine.144  
                                                                                                                     
 140. United States v. Milner, 583 F.3d 1174, 1189 (9th Cir. 2009) emphasizes the 
symmetry of the claims of the owners of the uplands and the tidelands. For example, Milner 
states that “both the Lummi and the Homeowners must accept that the ambulatory boundary is 
‘an inherent and essential attribute of the original property,’ and that both the tidelands and the 
uplands are subject to diminishment and expansion based on the forces of the sea.” Id. at 1188 
(quoting Cnty. of St. Clair v. Lovingston, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 46, 68 (1874)).  
 141. See supra note 39. 
 142. Cf. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 39, at 1091 (referring to “[w]hen a loss is left 
where it falls in an auto accident”). 
 143. As we mention below, loss-spreading already occurs through flood insurance and 
disaster relief, which promote risky investments on the coast. See infra note 169 and 
accompanying text. 
 144. Byrne, supra note 11, at 81–82 (discussing the potential that the public trust doctrine 
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The assignment of the entitlement can be made on efficiency, justice, 
or other grounds.145 We analyze the assignment on efficiency grounds, 
consistent with our view that a concern with efficiency underpins the 
existing presumption for a migratory coastal boundary. In determining 
whether to allocate the shifting land to the public trust or to private 
landowners, the legal decision maker should allocate the entitlement to 
the actor with the highest use value.146 To achieve “allocative 
efficiency,”147 the decision maker does not need to determine precisely 
the values that private landowners and the public place on the shifting 
lands, but only who between them is likely to place a higher value on 
the shifting land.148 The decision maker should not count on the parties 
being able to subsequently reallocate the entitlement through 
negotiation if the decision maker awards the entitlement to the lower 
value user because bargaining between the state and private landowners 
is likely to encounter high transaction costs.149  
It is an empirical question whether the public, acting through the 
state, or private landowners are likely to be the relatively higher value 
user of the shifting land. Economically oriented scholarship suggests 
that the public is likely the higher value user of the shifting lands under 
current circumstances, and we do not foresee any reason why the 
calculus might change in an era of sea level rise.150 While the law 
                                                                                                                     
might prevent the abrogation of accretion, because abrogation “would prospectively prevent the 
public from accessing tidelands or submerged lands”); Hiatt, supra note 25, at 382 (“[T]he 
public trust doctrine likely requires a state to take title or assert control on behalf of the public 
over submerged private lands.”).  
 145. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 39, at 1093; see Richard R.W. Brooks, The Relative 
Burden of Determining Property Rules and Liability Rules: Broken Elevators in the Cathedral, 
97 NW. U. L. REV. 267, 271 (2002).  
 146. See Brooks, supra note 145, at 270 n.11.  
 147. Id. at 283 (“[A]llocationally efficient rules direct entitlements to the parties who value 
them most.”). 
 148. Id.  
 149. If the general rule is that private landowners retain title to the shifting land, but these 
landowners prove to have lower value uses, the state, which represents the public, in theory 
could buy the land from the private landowners through the exercise of eminent domain. But 
there are procedural, economic, and political hurdles to the state’s exercise of eminent domain 
that in practice could thwart state efforts to buy out large numbers of private landowners over an 
extended period of time. See Smith, Property and Property Rules, supra note 3, at 1734 (“[T]he 
main constraints on the use of the eminent domain power are its cumbersomeness and any 
political opposition aroused by the possibility of its exercise in a given situation.” (citing 
Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 77–81 (1986))). If 
the state is awarded the shifting land as a trustee for the public and the public is the lower value 
user, then private landowners likely will have difficulty buying the lands back from the state. 
There are likely to be large numbers of landowners, and many of them might be tempted to free 
ride. The state also may be a difficult negotiating partner, again, because of procedural and 
political barriers to decision making. 
 150. See, e.g., Byrne, supra note 11, at 82; Rose, supra note 9, at 723; see also Hiatt, supra 
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exhibits a general presumption in favor of private property,151 the lands 
that underlie tidal and navigable waters immediately near the shore are 
distinctive and, as explained above, are not suitable for many uses made 
of uplands because either tides affect these lands or they remain 
completely submerged. Public trust lands are most amenable to uses 
such as navigation, recreation, fishing, and commerce, and public 
ownership enables the public to use the lands for these purposes by 
eliminating the potential for private landowners to put up roadblocks.152 
It is also public use of the public trust lands for these purposes that 
gives the lands their value.153  
The second question of whether private landowners should receive 
compensation arises if, contrary to what we argue, the entitlement over 
the shifting land shifts to private landowners. As already mentioned, 
legal decision makers might decide to shift the boundary on justice or 
fairness grounds, believing that it is no longer fair to burden private 
landowners with the costs of the loss of territory, because they no longer 
have the reciprocal prospect of gaining land, due to sea level rise 
attributable to climate change.  
The question of whether private landowners should receive 
compensation is similar to the more general question of when 
government should pay compensation for takings.154 Under existing law 
there is no governmental taking and compensation is not paid when the 
public trust encroaches on private land because of changes in the mean 
high water line. But the public trust encroaching on privately owned 
lands has a number of structural similarities to a government taking:  (1) 
the private landowner’s rights are diminished, and (2) the state becomes 
the beneficiary of the diminution in private rights because it is the state 
that safeguards the property as the trustee for the public.155  
                                                                                                                     
note 25, at 382 (“[T]he societal interest in public control of tidal lands and waters will be as 
applicable in our climate changed future as it has been since Roman times.”).  
 151. Rose, supra note 9, at 717. 
 152. See id. at 757–58 (describing “transportation and commerce” as “[t]he uses of 
waterways most subject to monopolization or holdout”); id. at 753, 757, 760 (explaining why 
locations for recreation might be susceptible to holdouts, after initially arguing that it is difficult 
to justify holding areas in trust for the public for recreation using the “anti-holdout rationale”); 
Epstein, supra note 33, at 415–16 (discussing the potential for holdouts if “navigable rivers and 
lakes” were privately owned). In Severance v. Patterson, the majority notes that fixing the 
boundary using avulsion may “allow[] private property owners to retain ownership of property 
that becomes submerged under the ocean.” 370 S.W.3d 705, 722 n.20. 
 153. Rose, supra note 9, at 770–71. 
 154. There is an extensive literature about the justifications for requiring compensation for 
takings. A classic article is Professor Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: 
Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 
(1967). 
 155. Thanks to Lewis Kornhauser for his help with framing the situation as similar to a 
government taking. 
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Several variables must be considered, assuming again that we are 
aiming to pay compensation only if it is warranted on efficiency 
grounds. The implications of not paying compensation for private 
landowners’ investment decisions are one potential justification for 
paying compensation.156 Professor Frank Michelman refers to these 
implications of not paying compensation as “demoralization costs.”157   
 Private landowners might respond in two ways to the prospect that 
rising sea levels will reduce the scope of their holdings. One possibility 
is that they will reduce investments in at-risk coastal property, an action 
that could decrease coastal property prices.158 A decline in investments 
in at-risk coastal property is economically desirable and not something 
to forestall through the payment of compensation. There is little point in 
encouraging investments in land that is at risk of sinking or increased 
flooding.159  
The other possibility is that landowners will invest in protective 
measures in an effort to ward off the erosion of their holdings.160 These 
might take the form of “hard armoring,” for example building erosion-
control structures, such as sea walls. There is also the possibility of 
“soft armoring,” such as reinforcing dunes and restoring wetlands.161 
                                                                                                                     
 156. Recall in this light Michelman’s statement that “[t]he correct utilitarian statement, 
then, insofar as the issue of compensability is concerned, is that compensation is due whenever 
demoralization costs exceed settlement costs, and not otherwise.” Michelman, supra note 154, at 
1215. 
 157. Id. at 1214 (“‘Demoralization costs’ are defined as the total of (1)  the dollar value 
necessary to offset disutilities which accrue to losers and their sympathizers specifically from 
the realization that no compensation is offered, and (2) the present capitalized dollar value of 
lost future production (reflecting either impaired incentives or social unrest) caused by 
demoralization of uncompensated losers, their sympathizers, and other observers disturbed by 
the thought that they themselves may be subjected to similar treatment on some other occasion.” 
(footnote omitted)).  
 158. Titus argues for “rolling easements” along the ocean coasts, partly on the basis that 
they will discourage property owners from inefficient investments. Titus, supra note 8, at 1325–
26. 
 159. New York Governor Andrew Cuomo’s proposal to spend as much as $400 million to buy 
out coastal property owners whose homes in flood-prone areas were destroyed by Hurricane Sandy 
is indicative of a growing recognition that, in view of expected sea level rise, some coastal 
investment should be discouraged. See Thomas Kaplan, Cuomo Is Seeking to Curb Building in 
Flooded Area, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2013, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/04/nyregion/cuomo-seeking-home-buyouts-in-flood-zones.html. 
 160. Michelman refers to the potential that a landowner might avoid a governmental taking 
by “devoting a large proportion of his energies and resources to counter-strategy aimed at 
fending off the risk” of a government taking. Michelman, supra note 154, at 1217. On the 
likelihood that private owners will resist the incursion of the public trust, see, for example, 
Byrne, supra note 25, at 626; Byrne, supra note 11, at 81. 
 161. Byrne, supra note 11, at 87 (defining hard and soft armoring); see also Mireya Navarro & 
Rachel Nuwer, Resisted for Blocking the View, Dunes Prove They Blunt Storms, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
4, 2012, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/04/science/earth/after-hurricane-
sandy-dunes-prove-they-blunt-storms.html (discussing the protection that dunes offered 
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The idea that landowners might engage in “armoring” is not idle 
speculation. When permitted by state law, coastal landowners do 
already invest in erosion control structures to preserve their parcels 
against natural changes.162  
Landowner investments in armoring are a form of self-help. As 
Professor Smith argues, “[S]elf-help measures . . . . are inefficient if 
they are less cost-effective than government-supplied protection.”163 
The relative cost-effectiveness of landowners’ and governmental 
protective measures is an empirical question. However, there is a 
reasonable basis for thinking that private self-help is likely to be less 
cost-effective than government-provided protection, especially if the 
external costs of private armoring are counted. It is well recognized that 
individual landowners’ hard armoring imposes costs on others, because 
the construction of a sea wall in one area may exacerbate erosion 
elsewhere, negatively affecting other private landowners, as well as 
public access to the shore.164 Governmental authorities might stand a 
better chance of devising mechanisms to control erosion that reflect 
broader social costs and benefits.165 Thus one argument in favor of 
compensation is that the absence of compensation encourages private 
self-help by landowners. However, it may be possible to limit 
landowner self-help by the regulation of erosion control structures and 
regulation may be a more cost-effective way of avoiding undesirable 
self-help than compensation. “A number of” coastal states already 
regulate the construction of erosion control structures, and there is case 
law holding that such regulation is not an unconstitutional taking such 
as to require compensation.166 In the end neither the possibility that 
landowners will invest in self-help nor the possibility that landowners 
                                                                                                                     
communities from the effects of Hurricane Sandy). 
 162. Byrne, supra note 11, at 101 (noting that “[a] number of states already prohibit 
armoring on the oceanfront, and so far these have survived takings challenges” but warning 
that the plurality opinion in Stop the Beach Renourishment might provide a basis for 
challenging prohibitions in some states); Titus, supra note 8, at 1281–82 (discussing the 
construction of sea walls along the coasts, especially along bays); Michael Schwirtz, 
Dispute in Hamptons Set Off by Effort to Hold Back Ocean, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2013, at 
A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/18/nyregion/southampton-homeowners-
build-barricades-to-hold-back-sea.html (reporting that Hamptons homeowners are building 
“barricades” in light of Hurricane Sandy). 
 163. Smith, Property and Property Rules, supra note 3, at 1785. 
 164. Byrne, supra note 11, at 87 (“Hard armoring . . . often increases erosion of 
neighboring properties by increasing current and wave action laterally against unprotected 
shorelines.”); see also Christie, supra note 2, at 37–38; Sax, supra note 24, at 642–43. 
 165. See Byrne, supra note 11, at 87; Epstein, supra note 11, at 41. 
 166. Byrne, supra note 11, at 101; see also Titus, supra note 8, at 1299, 1301, 1375, 1376 
(discussing state measures). However, Professor Byrne suggests that recent Supreme Court 
jurisprudence might jeopardize the ability of states to “prohibit[] armoring without 
compensation to owners.”  Byrne, supra note 11, at 102. 
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will curtail their investments in coastal property seems sufficiently 
problematic to justify the payment of compensation. 
Thus far we have concluded that compensation is not justified based 
on how landowners are likely to respond if they do not receive 
compensation. There are also other factors that weigh against 
compensation. A traditional factor is the associated administrative costs, 
which fall under Michelman’s rubric of “settlement costs.”167 
Compensating private landowners would require establishing a process 
for determining the amount to pay for the loss of lands attributable to 
sea level rise due to global warming. The causation issues are 
formidable if we want to construct a program that pays compensation 
only for land losses due to climate change. This is because it would be 
necessary to link losses in particular areas to climate change with a 
degree of certainty that is likely to be very difficult to attain.  
Another factor that weighs against compensation is the potential that 
compensation would exacerbate an existing moral hazard problem.168 
There already are subsidies for investing in coastal property, including 
subsidized flood insurance and disaster assistance, that likely encourage 
overinvestment in light of the risks.169 Paying compensation might 
further encourage investments that are socially undesirable given the 
risks of rising seas and greater numbers of increasingly severe weather 
events due to climate change.170  
In suggesting that governments should not compensate landowners 
                                                                                                                     
 167. Michelman, supra note 154, at 1214 (“‘Settlement costs’ are measured by the dollar 
value of the time, effort, and resources which would be required in order to reach compensation 
settlements adequate to avoid demoralization costs.”). 
 168.  There is a general argument that the “payment of full compensation to aggrieved 
property owners [for governmental takings of their property] can distort the owners’ primary 
behavior by creating moral hazard problems, thereby inducing them to overinvest in assets.” 
Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Case for Imperfect Enforcement of Property 
Rights, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1927, 1931 (2012). Professors Bell and Parchomovsky helpfully cite 
the literature analyzing the possibility that takings compensation could prompt moral hazard 
issues, including the important article by Lawrence Blume et al., The Taking of Land: When 
Should Compensation Be Paid?, 99 Q.J. ECON. 71 (1984). Id. at 1931 nn.13–15, 1951–52. 
 169. RAWLE O. KING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40650, NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE 
PROGRAM: BACKGROUND, CHALLENGES, AND FINANCIAL STATUS 8 (2012) (“The availability of 
federally-subsidized flood insurance in high-risk areas arguably encouraged too many people to 
locate in flood-prone areas and to not take appropriate steps to mitigate loss, leaving these 
financial losses to be either uncompensated or transferred to third-parties, including taxpayers 
via federal disaster assistance. Economists maintain that the assurance of federal assistance in 
the event of a repeated disaster creates a ‘moral hazard’ by lowering the incentives to avoid 
risk.”); see also Byrne, supra note 11, at 83–85 (urging reform of flood insurance); Tarlock, 
supra note 74, at 757 (“[A] federal flood-insurance program encourages over-building in high 
risk areas.”). 
 170. For a related argument, see Tarlock, supra note 74, at 756–57, where Professor 
Tarlock argues that climate change suggests that the risk of moral hazard should factor into 
takings analyses. 
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for losses caused by erosion due to climate change because it would not 
be efficient to do so, we do not intend to suggest that public policy 
should always be based on efficiency considerations. Yet efficiency 
should play a major role in deciding whether to compensate private 
property owners along the coast because efficiency is an important, if 
often unarticulated, underpinning of boundary determination along the 
coasts. Moreover, the force of the justice- or fairness-based concerns 
about landowners losing property without compensation would seem to 
be muted by the likelihood that their losses will be gradual. Provided 
change proceeds slowly, landowners should be able to gradually adjust 
their expectations to accord with the new realities along the coasts.171  
CONCLUSION 
Land borders usually are assumed to be fixed and stable. This Article 
has highlighted an important border that is generally unstable due to 
both natural forces and to a legal preference for an ambulatory 
boundary: the border between private and public trust property on ocean 
beaches. This Article has argued that this migratory boundary is 
efficient as a general rule in current circumstances, and that the 
boundary should be allowed to migrate as usual in an era of climate 
change. The ambulatory boundary protects the water adjacency of 
private landowners and the public, while promoting administrative 
efficiency. In individual circumstances where an ambulatory boundary 
is problematic, the boundary potentially can be fixed under the doctrine 
of avulsion, assuming that it applies along the coast in the relevant 
jurisdiction and that the changes along the shore are “sudden and 
perceptible.”172 However in general an ambulatory boundary remains an 
efficient way of recognizing the distinct combination of private and 
public interests on the beach.173 The modern preference for a migrating 
boundary reflects a wise balancing of interests that should be preserved 
going forward as the coastline changes along with the climate. 
                                                                                                                     
 171. See id.; Hiatt, supra note 25, at 393–94.  
 172. FLUSHMAN, supra note 8, at 94. As mentioned earlier, there may be legal obstacles to 
generically fixing the boundary. Supra note 61. 
 173. See, e.g., Sax, supra 11, at 356 (“The reality is that there exists on the seashore a zone 
that is neither wholly public nor wholly private, but in which some accommodation must be 
made between public and private entitlements.”); see also Epstein, supra note 11, at 45 
(observing that “[t]he boundaries of beachfront property . . . raise profound issues that do not 
arise with respect to most plots of land”). 
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